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REGULATING THE BORDER 
EUNICE LEE∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Under the current presidential administration, asylum seekers at 
our southern border have prompted enormous political contro-
versy.  Amidst a record-breaking government shutdown, the sepa-
ration of asylum-seeker families, the declaration of a national 
emergency, and other drastic actions, agency adjudicators at the 
border continued their daily work of screening asylum applicants.  
This process was not, however, untouched by the ongoing politici-
zation of the border.  Rather, in June 2018, then-Attorney General 
Jefferson Sessions issued a restrictive precedent decision, Matter 
of A-B-, targeting domestic violence asylum claims.  The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) rushed to implement Matter 
of A-B- in its border screenings, known as credible fear determi-
nations.  In December 2018, a federal district court judge enjoined 
several aspects of that decision and its implementation in credible 
fear processes.  In the interim, however, DHS likely refouled refu-
gees at the border as a result of the Attorney General’s asylum 
interpretations. 
 In this Article I will examine border adjudications within the 
structure of our administrative state.  I will consider proper roles 
between and within agencies, as well as among the agencies and 
courts. Specifically, I will consider how the underlying aims of ju-
dicial review of agency decisionmaking should shape and guide 
credible fear processes.  I will argue that revised agency practices 
and recalibrated judicial review can help ensure fair screenings: 
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ones that abide by statutory design and thereby help avoid re-
foulement of refugees.  For the agencies, I will suggest delayed or 
declined implementation of restrictive Department of Justice asy-
lum precedents at the border, as well as greater consideration of 
the views of the asylum office.  For the courts, I will propose 
stronger assertion of Article III primacy in declaring “what the 
law is” for screening purposes, as well as a recalibration of judi-
cial review to favor agency expertise over politicized decisionmak-
ing.  I will conclude with recommendations for structural and stat-
utory reforms of agency decisionmaking at the border and beyond. 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, thousands of asylum seekers flee dangerous conditions in 
their countries of origin and request safe haven in the United States, typically 
at the U.S.-Mexico border.  Under the current system, immigration officials 
conduct curtailed screening interviews of asylum seekers, making quick de-
cisions on whom to allow into our full immigration system.  Since 2017, as 
immigration officials went about this daily work, the Trump Administration 
issued a spate of policies targeting the arrival of asylum seekers at the border 
as a “threat,” “invasion,” and “emergency.”1  I will examine these border 
asylum adjudications at the present moment in our administrative state.  How 
do, and should, asylum screening interviews operate amidst the administra-
tion’s constant politicization of our border?  The screenings—credible fear 
proceedings within the expedited removal process—involve two levels of 
agency adjudicators sitting in two separate executive departments.  Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) asylum officers conduct curtailed, 
quick interviews; and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) immigration judges re-
view the interview outcomes in curtailed, quick hearings.  Both apply the 
domestic laws of Congress, implementing U.S. treaty obligations under the 
Refugee Convention and Protocol.2  And, although only one set of adjudica-
tors sits within the DOJ—immigration judges—both agencies must apply the 
precedential decisions of the Attorney General and their delegate, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 
To complicate matters further, the federal courts, of course, play a key 
role in asylum decisions, as they also interpret the immigration laws.  The 
courts do so both with and without deference to agency interpretations, de-
pending on the clarity of those laws (or the scope of Congressional delega-
tion).  But who properly pronounces the applicable contours of asylum law 
                                                          
 1.  See infra Part IV.  
 2.  United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. 
 
376 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:374 
in border screenings, and how and when should the various pronouncements 
be implemented?  And how should both DHS and DOJ approach the inter-
agency nature of decisionmaking to ensure fidelity to statutory and constitu-
tional design? 
In answering these questions, I will consider how the underlying aims 
of judicial review of agencies’ statutory interpretations should shape border 
screenings.  I will examine in particular the aims of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3—but also consider how courts and 
agencies might better approach asylum screenings even in Chevron’s ab-
sence.  As a focal point for this discussion, I will explore developing law in 
the area of domestic violence asylum claims.  In a controversial June 2018 
precedential decision, Matter of A-B-,4 then-Attorney General Sessions re-
versed BIA precedent on the viability of domestic violence asylum claims—
and did so despite DHS disagreement on that point.  Irrespective of its own 
prior contrary positions, DHS proceeded to immediately implement the Mat-
ter of A-B- decision in credible fear interviews.  But in December 2018, a 
United States District Court judge in the District of Columbia, enjoined sev-
eral aspects of the Matter of A-B- decision and DHS’s implementation in 
credible fear proceedings at the border.  Although the court’s decision was 
correct in rejecting flawed interpretations of asylum law in Matter of A-B- 
and the DHS guidance, and provided essential relief by enjoining them, the 
injunction left in place a structurally-flawed system of credible fear adjudi-
cations. 
My analysis will look closely at the structure of decisionmaking at the 
border to uncover a tension between the two central justifications for judicial 
deference to agency interpretations.  Namely, the technocratic expertise of 
the asylum adjudication system is easily undermined by the politically ac-
countable design of that same system.  Ultimately, I will conclude that Con-
gress has pronounced which aspect of the system must prevail in the context 
of asylum screenings, favoring technocratic expertise and non-politicized ad-
judication of claims.  Moreover, the standard for credible fear, considered in 
light of the respective roles of our three branches of government, requires 
agencies to allow greater space for judicial pronouncements of law.  As a 
result, I will argue that agencies must proceed with significant delay and cau-
tion before implementing restrictive agency precedent at the border and 
courts should assert their Article III primacy to declare “what the law is”5 in 
the context of credible fear interviews.  These recommendations find support 
under both Chevron and National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. 
                                                          
 3.  467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 4.  27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).  
 5.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
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Brand X Internet Services,6 as well as in the writings of Justice Gorsuch.7  I 
will further propose that courts recalibrate review to favor agency expertise, 
specifically of the asylum corps, to achieve better fidelity to statutory design 
of the asylum system.  These core recommendations are rooted in our asylum 
laws and in the proper weighing of agency expertise and would hold even in 
the absence of Chevron. 
My discussion proceeds in several parts.  First, in Part I, I will engage 
in a close review of our current frameworks for judicial review of agency 
statutory interpretations, focusing on justifications for deference.  Given the 
present uncertainty over Chevron, I also briefly consider a post-Chevron 
world.  Next, in Part II, I will provide an overview of the governing statutory 
frameworks for asylum and expedited removal, as well as practical limita-
tions within the asylum system.  With these legal frameworks in mind, in Part 
III I will trace the historical trajectory of domestic violence asylum claims in 
the agencies and courts as they lead to our present moment.  I will next in 
Part IV examine the politicized border under President Trump, then describe 
how domestic violence asylum claims were targeted as one aspect of his re-
strictive policies in Part V.  Finally, in Part VI I will propose new frameworks 
for judicial review and implementation of agency precedent at the border, 
then briefly touch upon potential interventions by Congress. 
I.  ON JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND ITS REASONS 
Although commentators have cast its future in doubt,8 Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. continues to structure judi-
cial review of agency interpretation.  Scholars have long debated the extent 
to which Chevron in fact changed prior judicial practices—but there is no 
doubt that the decision has impacted and shaped the landscape in decades 
since.9  In this Part, I examine Chevron and key shifts in its application, with 
                                                          
 6.  545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 7.  See infra Sections I.B, I.D. 
 8.  See, e.g., Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch’s Views on Chevron Deference, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limits-gor-
suchs-views-chevron-deference/; Joshua Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference?, 
TAKE CARE BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://www.takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-of-
chevron-deference.  
 9.  See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmak-
ing in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 84 n.5 (1994) (noting that 
some commentators “question whether Chevron represents the revolution in administrative law that 
many have proclaimed”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing-Let’s Call Them “Chev-
ron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2012) (“Administrative law 
scholars have leveled a forest of trees exploring the mysteries of the Chevron approach contempo-
rary judges take to reviewing law-related aspects of administrative action.”); Russel L. Weaver, 
Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 129–31 (1993) (claiming “Chevron’s im-
portance has been exaggerated”).  A Westlaw search reveals over 6000 reported cases citing the 
decision in the United States Courts of Appeals.  
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particular attention to rationales for deference articulated by jurists and schol-
ars.  I also briefly explore how deference may function in a post-Chevron 
future (namely, a likely return to a pre-Chevron past).  Finally, I trace Chev-
ron’s application in the Court’s asylum jurisprudence. 
A.  Chevron—The Current Framework 
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Reagan-era 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act, rejecting a challenge brought by environmental groups.10  The 1984 de-
cision set forth a new framework for judicial review of agency decisionmak-
ing.  At issue in Chevron was the EPA’s determination that a cluster of pol-
lution-emitting devices within a plant could be treated as a single “source,” 
thereby avoiding stringent permitting requirements under the Clean Air 
Act.11  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed, reasoning that 
such treatment failed to promote improved air quality and thus conflicted 
with the Act.12  The Supreme Court rejected not only the conclusion of the 
court below, but also the framework used to get there. 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, articulated a new two-step pro-
cess for examining the legality of an agency interpretation.  Under the first 
step, courts ask whether the statutory language has clear meaning,13 which 
includes a court “employing traditional tools of statutory construction” to 
“ascertain[] that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.”14  
If so, “that intention is the law and must be given effect.”15  If, on the other 
hand, the statute is ambiguous, the inquiry proceeds to step two, under which 
courts defer to a reasonable agency interpretation.16 
The majority provided two core sets of rationales for the high level of 
deference at Chevron step two—what Professor Cass Sunstein has character-
                                                          
 10.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 11.  Id. at 840. 
 12.  Id. at 841–42. 
 13.  Id. at 842–43. 
 14.  Id. at 843 n.9. 
 15.  Id.  The application of canons and the extent to which they can “fill in” any gaps in meaning 
in the text alone is oft-contested.  Some commentators have observed that step one as a result takes 
precedence in determining the outcomes of Chevron review.  See, e.g., Gregory G. Garre, CERCLA, 
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, and the D.C. Circuit’s Review of Agency Statutory Inter-
pretations Under Chevron, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 953 (1990) (“Chevron step one . . . has 
become the ‘primary battleground’ on which challenges to agency statutory interpretations are 
fought.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 990 
(1992) (“In short, under the two-step Chevron framework, everything turns on the theory of judicial 
interpretation adopted at step one.”). 
 16.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
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ized as “dual commitments to specialized competence and democratic ac-
countability.”17  The first commitment, rooted in practicality and expertise, 
recognizes the value of the knowledge of the agency.  Put simply, “[j]udges 
are not experts in the field”18—whereas the administrative bodies set up to 
daily administer a statute are.  This justification acknowledges the realities 
of the modern administrative state, wherein technocratic agencies play an 
outsized role in governance and rulemaking.19  The administration and regu-
lation of the Clean Air Act in Chevron, for example, required expertise in 
quantifying emissions, assessing new technologies, and measuring impacts 
on the environment and public health.20  The Court described the statute itself 
as “lengthy, detailed, technical, [and] complex.”21 
The second reason for deferring to agency decisions is rooted in separa-
tion of powers and political accountability principles.  Justice Stevens ex-
plained that because judges are not part of the two political branches of gov-
ernment, they must not make decisions on the basis of “personal policy 
preferences.”22  In contrast, agencies can properly rely upon the policy views 
of the incumbent administration to inform their judgements, as they are ulti-
mately democratically accountable to the people via the President.23  Thus, 
“it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make 
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself 
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency.”24 
                                                          
 17.  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006).  The Court in Chev-
ron also indicated that congressional delegation of interpretive authority to the agency could under-
lie deference; as explained in Section I.C. below, this line of reasoning was later taken up by the 
Court in what many commentators have referred to as a Chevron step zero.  
 18.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 19.  Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (“Broad delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modern administra-
tive state; agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they once were, the excep-
tion . . . .”).  
 20.  See The Clean Air Act: Solving Air Pollution Problems with Science and Technology, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-solving-
air-pollution-problems-science-and-technology (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).  
 21.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 848.  Justice Scalia, however, has noted that the precise question at 
issue—is a “bubble” a “source”?—is a fairly straightforward interpretive inquiry well within the 
competencies of the federal courts.  He expressed skepticism over the “expertise” rationale of Chev-
ron.  See Scalia, supra note 19, at 514 (“The cases, old and new, that accept administrative inter-
pretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in question, their intense familiarity with the 
history and purposes of the legislation at issue, their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate 
those purposes.  In other words, they are more likely than the courts to reach the correct result.”).  
 22.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 865–66. 
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Although commentators and some Justices have expressed disagree-
ment with these underlying aims,25 the Court has reiterated both the agency 
expertise and political accountability rationales over the years.26  In a recent 
decision, Kisor v. Wilkie,27 the Court similarly rooted “Auer deference” 28—
for agency interpretations of their own regulations—in the dual facets of 
agency’s specialized knowledge and their political/policy functions.29 
B.  Step Two’s Expansion (and Its Cabining by Critics) 
In 2000, the Court expanded the scope of agency authority at Chevron 
step two.  In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Inter-
net Services, a decision penned by Justice Thomas, the Court held that a rea-
sonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute prevails over a con-
trary judicial interpretation of that same statute.30  Only where the prior court 
decision construes an unambiguous statute—that is, under Chevron step 
one—does the prior judicial interpretation “trump[]” the agency’s contrary 
interpretation.31  Otherwise, under Chevron step two, the agency’s construc-
tion of the ambiguous statute will prevail so long as it is reasonable. 
Brand X engendered strong criticism, including a spirited dissent by Jus-
tice Scalia, joined in part by Justices Souter and Ginsberg.  In a single mem-
ber portion of his dissent, Justice Scalia described the majority decision as 
                                                          
 25.  See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 19, at 514.  Justice Scalia expressed skepticism over the ra-
tionale of agency expertise, reasoning that Chevron should instead survive for reflecting proper 
deference to the policymaking function of agencies and for providing legislators with a bright line 
rule to guide legislative design.  Id. at 514–17, 521; see also Citron, supra note 8 (discussing Justice 
Gorsuch’s critiques and their alignment with conventional “high-school civics” teachings of sepa-
ration of powers). 
 26.  In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., for example, the Court reaffirmed that 
“practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.”  496 
U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990).  The Court there deferred to the agency administrator’s decision to restore 
certain pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, reversing the determi-
nation of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the agency 
decision was arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 647.  As explained in Section I.E. below, the Court has 
also reaffirmed the political accountability principle through the years, deeming it particularly 
strong in the area of immigration. 
 27.  139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 28.  Auer deference refers to the standard of review for agencies’ interpretations of their own 
regulations, announced in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 29.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413 (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.) (rooting Auer in the “unique 
expertise” of agencies and the fact that “they are subject to the supervision of the President, who in 
turn answers to the public”); see also id. at 2416–17 (majority opinion) (explaining that for Auer to 
even apply, a decision must be authoritative and understood to “emanate from those [agency heads 
or] actors” to whom Congress delegated authority and must “implicate its substantive expertise”).  
Justice Kagan also identified agencies’ ability to conduct factual investigation as a reason for def-
erence.  Id. at 2413. 
 30.  545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005). 
 31.  Id. at 982 (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).  
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“yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial decisions subject to reversal by 
executive officers.”32  He lamented the majority’s failure to take seriously the 
primacy of the judiciary in interpreting law.  Or, as he put it, “Article III 
courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or ignored by exec-
utive officers.”33 
In his authorship of Tenth Circuit immigration decisions, then-Judge 
Gorsuch took up Justice Scalia’s line of reasoning to cabin the temporal reach 
of Brand X.  He accepted that Brand X permitted the BIA to “effectively 
overrule[]” a court,34 but limited the ability of agency decisions under Brand 
X to operate retroactively and, to a certain extent, prospectively.   
In 2015 in De Niz Robles v. Lynch,35 then-Judge Gorsuch wrote for the 
unanimous panel holding the BIA could not retroactively apply a Brand-X-
invoking agency decision that conflicted with the Tenth Circuit’s prior judi-
cial interpretation of an ambiguous statute.36  At issue was whether the peti-
tioner, Mr. De Niz Robles, could obtain permanent resident status even with 
multiple unlawful entries.  Under the Tenth Circuit’s 2006 interpretation of 
the Immigration Code in Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (“Padilla-Caldera 
I”),37 Mr. De Niz Robles was eligible for permanent residence.38  However, 
under a 2007 BIA decision, Matter of Briones,39 which invoked Brand X to 
reject Padilla-Caldera I, he was not.40  Mr. De Niz Robles had applied for 
permanent residence after the Tenth Circuit issued Padilla-Caldera I and be-
fore the BIA issued Matter of Briones.  Then-Judge Gorsuch concluded that 
Matter of Briones could not retroactively apply to Mr. De Niz Robles, and 
that accordingly  Padilla-Caldera I—the judicial decision—controlled his 
case.  Thus, Mr. De Niz Robles remained eligible for permanent residence.  
In explaining why the agency decision should apply only prospectively, 
                                                          
 32.  Id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 33.  Id. at 1017. 
 34.  De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).  
 35.  803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 36.  Id. at 1169.  The 2006 Tenth Circuit decision, Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales (“Padilla-Cal-
dera I”) held that the immigration courts had authority to grant permanent residence to petitioners 
with multiple unlawful entries.  The Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) 2007 decision, Matter 
of Briones, invoked Brand X to reach to the opposite conclusion, holding instead that immigrants 
with multiple entries were barred from obtaining permanent residence from the immigration courts.  
24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 371 n.9 (B.I.A. 2007).  Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit in a 2011 decision, Pa-
dilla-Caldera v. Holder (“Padilla-Caldera II”), deferred to the agency interpretation in Matter of 
Briones.  637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 37.   453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 38.  Id. at 1244. 
 39. 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 40.  Id. at 371. 
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Judge Gorsuch noted that agency interpretations are policy-driven and there-
fore lack permanency: “the agency judgment to which the court defers is not 
‘a once-and-for-always definition of what the statute means.’”41 
In a 2011 decision, Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (“Padilla-Caldera II”),42 
the Tenth Circuit reexamined the statute at issue in Padilla-Caldera I.  It held 
that the BIA’s intervening decision in Matter of Briones was reasonable and 
thus entitled to Chevron deference under Brand X.43  Thus, the Tenth Circuit 
in Padilla-Caldera II held that, pursuant to Matter of Briones, petitioners 
with multiple unlawful reentries would no longer be eligible for permanent 
residence within the Tenth Circuit.44 
Yet, in a 2016 decision, Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 45 then-Judge Gor-
such authored another Tenth Circuit decision cabining the temporal reach of 
the agency decision—this time ruling that, in certain cases, the BIA’s deci-
sion in Matter of Briones could not apply even prospectively.46  Mr. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, applied for permanent residence after the BIA decided 
Matter of Briones in 2007—but before the Tenth Circuit decided Padilla-
Caldera II in 2011.47  
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Gorsuch concluded that in this 
posture as well, the judicial construction from Padilla-Caldera I must apply.  
He characterized the court’s prior decision in De Niz Robles as a pronounce-
ment that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Briones “was not legally effective 
in the Tenth Circuit until this court discharged its obligation under Chevron 
step two and Brand X to determine that the statutory provisions at issue were 
indeed ambiguous, that the BIA’s interpretation of them was indeed reason-
able.”48  He stressed that people need to be able to rely on “judicial declara-
tions of what the law is.”49 
In a separate concurrence, not joined by the rest of the panel, then-Judge 
Gorsuch took on the “elephant in the room with us today”: the fact that, in 
his view, “Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow 
huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal 
power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Con-
stitution of the framers’ design.”50  He concluded that “Chevron seems no 
                                                          
 41.  De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1174 n.7 (quoting Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 
515–16 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
 42.  637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) 
 43.  Id. at 1153. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 46.  See id. at 1145. 
 47.  Recall that Mr. De Niz Robles, meanwhile, had applied for permanent residence before the 
BIA issued Matter of Briones.  
 48.  Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1145.  
 49.  Id. at 1143.  
 50.  Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 
2020] REGULATING THE BORDER 383 
less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”51  By 
permitting courts to avoid their core function of interpreting law and saying 
what it is, he argued, the doctrine invites the political branches to intrude on 
judicial functions, raising due process and equal protection concerns.52  Judge 
Gorsuch questioned whether the Constitution in fact permits the legislature 
to delegate lawmaking authority to the executive and cautioned against a doc-
trine that allows “an avowedly politicized administrative agent seeking to 
pursue whatever policy whim may rule the day” to curtail people’s liberties.53  
He concluded his concurrence with a call to overrule Chevron.54 
C.  Step Zero 
In addition to disagreeing with Chevron’s fundamentals, then-Judge 
Gorsuch took the Supreme Court to task for muddying its waters considera-
bly in its subsequent decisions.55  And indeed, although Brand X expanded 
the agency’s authority at step two, the emergence of what Professors Thomas 
Merrill and Kristin Hickman termed a Chevron “step zero” shifted the bal-
ance of power back toward the courts—but in somewhat unpredictable fash-
ion.56  As Professor Sunstein notes, the question of applicability of Chevron 
was “largely invisible” in the decision’s first decade, with several decisions 
applying its two-step formula without considering the threshold question: 
Should Chevron framework even be used?57  In a series of cases, most nota-
bly in United States v. Mead Corp.,58 the Court announced a more searching 
inquiry along these lines.59 
                                                          
 51.  Id. at 1152. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 1153. 
 54.  Id. at 1158 (“We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron.  We could 
do it again.”). 
 55.  Id. at 1157 (“Neither, respectfully, does looking to the Supreme Court’s case law supply a 
great deal of guidance on how to apply Mead’s balancing test.”).  
 56.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 
(2001) (coining the phrase Chevron “step zero” to describe “the inquiry that must be made in de-
ciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all”).  
 57.  Sunstein, supra note 17, at 208.  Professor Sunstein also explores then-Judge Breyer’s and 
Justice Scalia’s differing views on Chevron in its earlier days.  Whereas Breyer advocated for a 
more flexible case-by-case approach to Chevron, in which judges take a hard look at the legislative 
text and context to ascertain whether an intent to delegate is present, or at the very least, not implau-
sible, see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 
370–82 (1986), Scalia urged a uniform rule of applying Chevron across the board, which would be 
easier for litigants and the lower courts to apply and more readily put legislators on notice regarding 
the interpretive authority of agencies, Scalia, supra note 19, at 516–17.  Or, as Professor Sunstein 
observes, the two clashed over whether Chevron should be applied as a standard or a rule.  Sunstein, 
supra note 17, at 192. 
 58.  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 59.  Id.  In an earlier case, Christensen v. Harris County, Justice Scalia penned a concurrence 
criticizing the majority’s application of step-zero-type analysis to an opinion letter of a Department 
of Labor Wage and Hour Division administrator.  529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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In Mead, the Court held Chevron deference is afforded only where Con-
gress delegates authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of 
law and where an agency interpretation exercises that authority.60  To decide 
whether delegation exists absent an express statement by Congress, the Court 
looked to the degree of formality and procedure involved in the agency deci-
sion.61  The Mead majority determined that delegated authority, and thus the 
Chevron framework, did not apply to a tariff classification ruling by the U.S. 
Customs Service.62  That, however, did not mean no deference at all was 
warranted.  Rather, the Court applied its 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift,63 
looking to whether the agency decision had the “power to persuade.”64 
Justice Scalia dissented in Mead, urging stronger adherence to Chev-
ron’s simpler two-step inquiry.65  Rather than engaging in a step zero-type 
analysis, he argued, courts should simply look for ambiguity in the statute.  
If present, the “[a]mbiguity means Congress intended agency discretion.  Any 
resolution of the ambiguity by the administering agency that is authorita-
tive—that represents the official position of the agency—must be accepted 
by the courts if it is reasonable.”66  Justice Scalia characterized Skidmore as 
an “anachronism” and criticized the Court for “breathing new life” into it.67  
As Professor Sunstein has noted, Mead reflects that “[t]o a significant extent, 
Justice Breyer has succeeded in ensuring case-by-case assessments of 
whether Congress intended to delegate law-interpreting power to agencies.”68 
                                                          
The majority determined opinion letters lacked the “force of law” and thus “do not warrant Chevron-
style deference.”  Id. at 587.  Justice Scalia disagreed and argued deference was due simply because 
the opinion letter reflected the authoritative view of the Secretary of Labor; he joined the judgment 
of the Court, however, because he viewed the Secretary’s interpretation as unreasonable.  Id. at 589 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  
 60.  Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27, 229. 
 61.  Id. at 229 (“[A] . . . good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express 
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces 
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).  
 62.  Id. at 226–28. 
 63.  323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 64.  Mead Corp., 433 U.S. at 226–28 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
 65.  Id. at 239, 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66.  Id. at 257.  
 67.  Id. at 250.  
 68.  Sunstein, supra note 17, at 247.  A 2019 decision penned by Justice Gorsuch confirms the 
robustness of that inquiry.  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the majority declined to apply Chevron 
deference to an interpretation of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) that implicated not 
only the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which it administers, but also the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, which it does not.  138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).  The NLRB had held that the NLRA prohib-
ited the enforcement of agreements requiring individualized arbitration, rather than class or collec-
tive actions.  The majority held that petitioner’s (and NLRB’s) view was foreclosed by the plain 
text of the statute.  It went on to explain that petitioners could not “seek[] shelter in Chevron” be-
cause “[o]ne of Chevron’s essential premises is simply missing” where an agency interpretation 
exceeds the scope of its delegated authority by limiting a second statute it does not administer.  Id. 
at 1629.  
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D.  Before, Outside, and After(?) Chevron 
The Skidmore decision, newly applied in Mead, predated Chevron by 
some decades.  In that 1944 decision, the Court pronounced a more flexible 
standard for judicial consideration of agency statutory interpretation.  Recent 
shifts in the Court suggest a possible return to this earlier approach. 
Skidmore considered whether overtime pay under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act applied to on-call employees.69  The lower courts had concluded 
simply that it could not, whereas the agency adopted a more nuanced view.70  
The Court, reversing, considered that the views of the agency, “while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body 
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”71  It continued, “The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consid-
eration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.”72  The Court also noted that deference could be due based 
on agencies’ “specialized experience and broader investigations and infor-
mation.”73 
Recently in Kisor v. Wilkie, a bare majority kept in place Auer defer-
ence,74 which applies a Chevron-type two-step inquiry to agency interpreta-
tions of their own regulations.75  Although Chevron itself was not at issue, 
the decision reveals much about how a future Court might treat both doc-
trines.  Justice Roberts joined in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kagan, preserving 
Auer largely on grounds of stare decisis.76  True to his reputation as the most 
ardent opponent of current deference frameworks,77 Justice Gorsuch penned 
a concurrence joined fully by Justice Thomas, and in part by Justices Alito 
and Kavanaugh, arguing for Auer’s demise.78  Echoing his Tenth Circuit con-
currence in Gutierrez-Brizuela criticizing Chevron, Justice Gorsuch urged 
the judiciary to reclaim its primacy in declaring what law is.  He opened by 
                                                          
 69.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135. 
 70.  Id. at 134–40. 
 71.  Id. at 140.  
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 139; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.  
 74.  139 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019). 
 75.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 76.  The majority opinion also imposed a more searching inquiry at the outset to determine 
whether Auer should actually apply, that is, an Auer step zero.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416–18. 
 77.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice Gorsuch Fulfills Expectations from the Right and the Left, 
ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-
justice-gorsuch-fulfills-expectations-from-right-and-left (“Many predict that [Justice Gorsuch] will 
be a leader on the court in urging greater judicial oversight over the administrative state.  His opin-
ions so far suggest that indeed he will try to push the court in this direction.”).  
 78.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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voicing particular concern for the consolidation of power in the executive vis-
à-vis ordinary people, castigating Auer for “creat[ing] a ‘systematic judicial 
bias in favor of the federal government, the most powerful of parties, and 
against everyone else.’”79 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence also expressly identified Skidmore as the 
would-be status quo in a post-Auer world (and presumably, post-Chevron one 
as well): “Overruling Auer would have taken us directly back to Skidmore, 
liberating courts to decide cases based on their independent judgment and 
‘follow [the] agency’s [view] only to the extent it is persuasive.’”80 
Notably, his approach under Skidmore allows agency expertise to serve 
as a basis for deference but moves decidedly away from political accounta-
bility as a reason.  On expertise, he stated plainly, “no one doubts that courts 
should pay close attention to an expert agency’s views on technical questions 
in its field.”81  Although he believed courts should remain open to other in-
terpretations to a greater extent than permitted under Auer, he nevertheless 
agreed with the majority that “of course . . . respectful consideration” is due 
to the expertise of the agency.82 
On the political accountability rationale, Justice Gorsuch was decidedly 
less sanguine.  Far from justifying deference to an agency, the political nature 
of agencies in his view underscores the danger of deference frameworks.  
Judges, in his view, should not be “forced to subordinate their own views 
about what the law means to those of a political actor,”83 but instead must 
“guard the people from the arbitrary use of governmental power.”84  The 
founders, he asserted, “knew that when political actors are left free not only 
to adopt and enforce written laws, but also to control the interpretation of 
those laws, the legal rights of ‘litigants with unpopular or minority causes 
or . . . who belong to despised or suspect classes’ count for little.”85  He con-
tinued: 
Maybe the powerful, well-heeled, popular, and connected can 
wheedle favorable outcomes from a system like that—but what 
about everyone else?  They are left always a little unsure what the 
law is, at the mercy of political actors and the shifting winds of 
popular opinion, and without the chance for a fair hearing before a 
                                                          
 79.  Id. (quoting Paul Larkin & Elizabeth Slattery, The World After Seminole Rock and Auer, 
42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 625, 641 (2019)).  His concurrence also explored at length how, in his 
view, the Auer framework violates the Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. at 2432–35. 
 80.  Id. at 2447 (alterations in original) (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 
(2006)).  
 81.  Id. at 2442. 
 82.  Id. at 2443. 
 83.  Id. at 2429. 
 84.  Id. at 2438. 
 85.  Id. at 2437 (alteration in original) (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 412 
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
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neutral judge.  The rule of law begins to bleed into the rule of 
men.86 
Thus, whereas agency expertise would continue to receive deference 
from the courts even under Justice Gorsuch’s approach, politically-driven 
agency decisions likely would not. 
E.  Chevron in Asylum Law 
In the realm of immigration, the Supreme Court has extended Chevron 
to precedent decisions of the BIA, including on substantive asylum law.  It 
has done so in ways, moreover, that to some extent have allowed the “rule of 
law . . . to bleed into the rule of men,”87 as Justice Gorsuch warned, by de-
ferring to political considerations.88 
In 1987 in Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca,89 the Court first applied the Chevron framework to the refugee defini-
tion, addressing the meaning of a “well-founded fear” of persecution.90  The 
agency had construed “well-founded fear” for asylum purposes to require a 
more-likely-than-not showing—the same standard governing withholding of 
removal, a lesser form of protection.91  Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens 
disagreed with the agency, applying statutory canons of construction to con-
clude that the two standards were not identical.92 
Notably, the Court found ambiguity in the term “well-founded fear,” but 
nevertheless rejected the agency’s construction at step one of Chevron be-
cause the statute was sufficiently clear in differentiating between the two 
standards.  The Court recognized that Chevron deference to the BIA as the 
delegate of the Attorney General was appropriate where the BIA gave “con-
crete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.”93  However, 
it deemed the question presented by the case as properly resolved by the 
courts: 
[O]ur task today is much narrower, and is well within the province 
of the Judiciary.  We do not attempt to set forth a detailed descrip-
tion of how the “well-founded fear” test should be applied.  In-
stead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were 
incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical.94 
                                                          
 86.  Id. at 2438. 
 87.  Id.   
 88.  See supra Section I.D.  
 89.  480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 90.  Id. at 448. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 448–49. 
 93.  Id. at 448.  
 94.  Id. (footnote omitted).   
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In a footnote, the Court additionally noted that the BIA’s shifting posi-
tions on the matter undermined the government’s claim of deference.95  The 
Court did not provide a controlling definition of well-founded fear, instead 
remanding to the agency to redefine the term.  A lengthy portion of its opin-
ion explored legislative history and international law understandings to reach 
its conclusion.  This analysis drew spirited criticism from Justice Scalia in a 
separate concurrence for (in his view) ranging beyond the step one inquiry 
into statutory ambiguity.96 
In a 1999 case, Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Aguirre-
Aguirre,97 a unanimous Court again applied Chevron to the BIA’s construc-
tion of domestic refugee law.  In this case, it deferred to the agency construc-
tion.98  At issue was the test developed by the BIA for the serious non-polit-
ical crime bar to withholding of removal.99  The BIA’s standard focused on 
whether the common-law criminal nature of the act outweighed its political 
aspects.100  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the BIA’s test, concluding that adjudicators must also consider other factors, 
including the relative seriousness of the conduct vis-à-vis risk of persecution, 
as well as the atrociousness of the act.101  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It 
                                                          
 95.  The Court explained:  
  An additional reason for rejecting the INS’s request for heightened deference to its 
position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years.  An 
agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier 
interpretation is “entitled to considerably less deference” than a consistently held agency 
view. 
Id. at 446 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)).  
 96.  In a concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed that plain textual analysis supported the majority’s 
conclusion, as “the INS’s interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of that phrase 
and the structure of the Act.”  Id. at 453 (Scalia. J., concurring).  He disagreed strongly, however, 
with the majority’s application of canons of statutory construction at Chevron step one, as well as 
its in-depth exploration of legislative history.  In his view:  
The Court . . . implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that 
of an agency whenever, “[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,” they 
are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute.  But this ap-
proach would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only 
if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue.  This is not an 
interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron. 
Id. at 454 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 97.  526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 98.  Id. at 424–25.  
 99.  Id. at 418–19.  Withholding of removal prohibits the return of refugees to their countries 
of origin where they will likely face persecution but provides less permanent status and fewer rights 
than full asylum status.  The applicable provision for serious non-political crime bar at the time was 
located at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994) (repealed 1996).  Currently, the serious non-political 
bars for asylum and withholding are at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2009) and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2012), respectively.  
 100.  See Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97–98 (B.I.A. 1984) (discussing Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 422).  
 101. Aguirre-Aguirre v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 121 F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1997), 
rev’d, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).  
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held that the circuit court erred in both failing to apply Chevron and failing 
to defer to the BIA’s interpretation.102  The Court emphasized, “judicial def-
erence to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration 
context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that 
implicate questions of foreign relations.’”103 
In Negusie v. Holder,104 the Supreme Court reiterated this same point—
the “special importance” of judicial deference in immigration due to political 
and foreign relations implications.105  Its decision, however, declined to ac-
tually apply Chevron in rejecting the BIA’s interpretation of the persecutor 
of others bar to asylum and withholding.106  The Court determined the BIA 
had wrongly considered itself bound by an earlier Supreme Court decision, 
Fedorenko v. United States,107 which had interpreted a different statutory pro-
vision.  Thus, the Court concluded “that the BIA has not exercised its inter-
pretive authority but, instead, has determined that Fedorenko controls.”108  
This “mistaken assumption,” it continued, “stems from a failure to recognize 
the inapplicability of the principle of statutory construction invoked in Fe-
                                                          
 102.  Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25.  
 103. Id. at 425 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 
(1988)).  The Court in Abudu held that federal courts review BIA denials of motions to reopen based 
on untimeliness under an abuse of discretion standard.  It explained that deference to the adminis-
trative agency was due to political nature of INS proceedings:  
In sum, although all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some degree judicial 
and to some degree political—and therefore an abuse-of-discretion standard will often 
apply to agency adjudications not governed by specific statutory commands—INS offi-
cials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of for-
eign relations, and therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on pe-
titions for reopening or reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply with even 
greater force in the INS context. 
Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110 (footnotes omitted).  Mr. Abudu, the respondent, had received a prior de-
portation order but sought to reopen his case to apply for asylum.  Id. at 97. 
 104.  555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
 105.  Id. at 517. 
 106.  The persecutor bar applies to individuals who “assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (for asylum); see also id. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (for withholding).  
 107.  449 U.S. 490 (1980).  Fedorenko interpreted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. 
No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1951–66 (1951)) (no longer in force).  The Court held that 
under the statute, serving as a concentration camp armed guard—even if involuntary—amounted to 
participating in persecution under the Nazi regime and rendered the applicant ineligible for a Dis-
placed Persons Act visa.  In concluding that a voluntariness requirement did not apply, the Court 
considered that a different provision in the same act—barring individuals who “voluntarily assisted 
the enemy forces”—did include an express voluntariness consideration.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 
512.  In contrast, the persecutor bar for asylum and withholding considered in Negusie does not 
appear alongside any other bar expressly requiring voluntariness.  See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 518–19. 
 108.  Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522. 
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dorenko, as well as a failure to appreciate the differences in statutory pur-
pose.”109  Applying the ordinary remand rule,110 the Court remanded the case 
for the agency to construe the bar in the first instance. 
These immigration decisions reveal a tendency for the Court to locate 
the rationale for Chevron deference in the area of asylum in the political ac-
countability and policy functions of the agency.  They also reveal, however, 
a willingness to scrutinize the logic of the agency’s reasoning at step one, as 
in Cardoza-Fonseca, and to engage in a step-zero-type look into whether the 
agency in fact exercised its delegated authority, as in Negusie.  Aguirre-
Aguirre, however, confirms that within those bounds, the Court has been 
willing to defer to the agency, viewing asylum law as implicating sensitive 
political and foreign relations functions.  Yet, as I explore in Part II, this view 
of asylum law does not properly reflect Congress’s intent in designing a de-
politicized asylum system. 
II.  ASYLUM AND EXPEDITED REMOVAL 
Below, I provide a brief overview of the core international and domestic 
refugee frameworks, as well as the U.S. asylum system, particularly as they 
relate to expedited screening processes in immigration law. I also discuss the 
structure of asylum decisionmaking. 
A.  Refugee Protocol and Act 
In 1968, the United States signed onto the U.N. Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Protocol”),111 which incorporated the key sub-
stantive provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“Refugee Convention”).112  Under these conventions, a refugee is 
an individual who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country.”113  At the heart of these instruments is a prohibition on the return 
of refugees to persecution, or refoulement—a norm that has since risen to the 
level of customary international law.114 
                                                          
 109.  Id.  
 110.  See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) 
(per curiam) (holding that if BIA has not yet spoken on “a matter that statutes place primarily in 
agency hands,” the ordinary remand requires court to “giv[e] the BIA the opportunity to address the 
matter in the first instance in light of its own expertise”).  
 111.  Refugee Protocol, supra note 2. 
 112.  Refugee Convention, supra note 2.    
 113.  Refugee Convention, supra note 112, at art. 1(A)(2).  
 114.  See, e.g., Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Prin-
ciple of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 149 
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Over a decade later, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980,115 which 
created a comprehensive system for the adjudication of refugee claims of in-
dividuals abroad and in the United States.116  Via the substantive provisions 
of this law, Congress intended to bring the United States into compliance 
with its obligations under the Refugee Protocol—as emphasized explicitly 
throughout the legislative history.117  Central to the 1980 Act was the enact-
ment of a uniform refugee definition derived from international law.118  This 
core definition does not require a showing of certain or even likely harm, but 
rather only a “well-founded fear” that the individual will be persecuted upon 
return to her country.  The Supreme Court has stated that a one in ten chance 
of persecution meets this standard.119 
Critically, Congress enacted the Refugee Act with the explicit aim of 
changing the executive branch’s prior ad hoc and discriminatory approach to 
refugee protection, which was driven by foreign policy, geography, and ide-
ological concerns.  The Senate Report accompanying the Senate version of 
the Act highlights “repeal[ing] the current immigration law’s discriminatory 
treatment of refugees by providing a new definition of a refugee that recog-
nizes the plight of homeless people all over the world” as the first of the bill’s 
“five basic objectives.”120 
B.  Asylum Seekers at the Border: Expedited Removal 
Prior to 1996, all individuals seeking asylum generally had a right to an 
evidentiary hearing on their asylum claim.  Individuals apprehended at ports 
of entry, including border ports, had fewer procedural protections than indi-
                                                          
(Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003) (ebook) (“[N]on-refoulement must be regarded as a principle of cus-
tomary international law.”); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, The Principle of Non-Re-
foulement as a Norm of Customary International Law, Response to the Questions posed to UNHCR 
by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 
BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, REFWORLD (Jan. 31, 1994), https://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/437b6db64.html.  
 115.  Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 116.  Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); see also Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The 
Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 30 
(1981). 
 117.  See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) 
(“If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the 
entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law 
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . .”). 
 118.  Refugee Convention, supra note 112, at art. 1(A)(2). 
 119.  See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440. 
 120.  S. REP. 96-256, at 1–2 (1980); see also 125 CONG. REC. 4481 (1979) (“The basic purpose 
of the bill I introduce today is to update the law—and to help insure greater equity in our treatment 
of refugees and displaced persons and to establish a more orderly procedure for their admission into 
the United States in reasonable numbers.”).  
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viduals already in the United States but, nevertheless, would receive an ex-
clusion hearing before an immigration judge on their asylum claims.121  Alt-
hough less robust than the deportation hearing received by individuals (in-
cluding asylum seekers) already in the interior of the United States, exclusion 
hearings permitted asylum applicants to present and receive evidence, give 
testimony, secure witnesses, and appeal an adverse decision.122  In 1996, 
however, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).123  IIRIRA eliminated deportation 
and exclusion hearings, replacing them with more general removal proceed-
ings and curtailed admission procedures.124  Most notably—with regard to 
individuals seeking but not yet granted admission to the United States—
IIRIRA largely did away with the right to an evidentiary hearing, with few 
exceptions.125  Instead, it created a curtailed process called expedited re-
moval, which made it far easier for immigration authorities to remove indi-
viduals at the border.126 
Under the new scheme, immigration enforcement officials can issue an 
administrative order and promptly return an individual to their home country, 
even absent further review or a hearing before a neutral adjudicator.127  In 
essence, expedited removal allows DHS to act as the prosecutor and the judge 
with respect to applicants for admission.128  IIRIRA authorizes expedited re-
moval of individuals who arrive at ports of entry without valid entry docu-
ments or who commit misrepresentation or fraud.129  It further permits (but 
does not require) the use of expedited removal for individuals who have been 
in the United States for less than two years and who are similarly inadmissi-
ble due to fraud or lack of entry documents.130 
Until 2019, the government applied expedited removal to the following 
three groups of individuals: (1) “arriving aliens” who seek to enter the United 
                                                          
 121.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1952).  
 122.  Id.; see, e.g., Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that robust proce-
dural rights, including a right to translation of proceedings, was required under statute with regard 
to asylum claim, and under the Fifth Amendment with regard to mandatory withholding claim). 
 123.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Certain individuals who are applicants for admission do continue to have a right to a hear-
ing, if they claim they are in fact asylees, refugees, or lawful permanent refugees.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(C) (2012).  
 126.  See generally id. § 1225 (including in title “expedited removal of inadmissible arriving 
aliens”).  
 127.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 128.  See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ET AL., EXPEDITED REMOVAL: WHAT HAS CHANGED 
SINCE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13767, BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
IMPROVEMENTS (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/prac-
tice_advisory/final_expedited_removal_advisory-_updated_2-21-17.pdf.   
 129.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 130.  Id. § 1225(b).  
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States;131 (2) individuals interdicted by sea without being admitted or pa-
roled, who have been in the United States for less than two years;132 and (3) 
individuals apprehended within 100 miles of a land border within fourteen 
days of entering the country, who have not been admitted or paroled.133  More 
recently, the Trump Administration has expanded expedited removal to the 
fullest extent of law, applying it to inadmissible individuals in the United 
States for less than two years.134 
Importantly, expedited removal contains critical protections for asylum 
seekers, implementing screening provisions for those who express a desire to 
seek asylum or a fear of return to their home countries.  When encountered 
by immigration officials, such individuals must be referred for a “credible 
fear interview.”135  If an asylum seeker passes the interview, they will then 
be permitted to pursue their asylum claims in a full merits hearing before an 
immigration judge.136  If the asylum seeker fails the screening interview, they 
may request de novo review by an immigration judge—who, unlike the asy-
lum officer, is an immigration generalist rather than a refugee specialist.137  
However, that review hearing does not incorporate the full panoply of proce-
dural protections of a regular removal hearing.138  There is no further review 
of the credible fear decision authorized by statute, except for a limited habeas 
inquiry.139  If an applicant fails at the immigration judge review stage, DHS 
will quickly return them to their home country.140 
                                                          
 131.  Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct 
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1.2 (2019) (defining “arriving aliens” as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to 
come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States 
at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into 
the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the 
means of transport”).  
 132.  Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(1)(a)(iii) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924 (Nov. 12, 2002).  
 133.  Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004).  
 134.  See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409 (July 22, 2019); Bor-
der Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795–96 (Jan. 25, 
2017). 
 135.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30, 235.3(b)(4) (2019).  
 136.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1229a(b)(4). 
 137.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g), 1208.30(g)(2).  
 138.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g), 1208.30(g)(2).  
 139.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(IV)(A).  
 140.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e).  This provision permits judicial review of individual expedited 
removal orders for only a narrow subset of issues: 
  Judicial review of any determination made under section 1225(b)(1) . . . is available 
in habeas corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to determinations of— 
  (A) whether the petitioner is an alien, 
  (B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under [§1225(b)(1)], and 
  (C) whether the petitioner can prove . . . that the petitioner is [a lawful permanent res-
ident], has been admitted as a refugee . . . or has been granted asylum . . . . 
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Although curtailed in nature, Congress designed the credible fear pro-
cess to ensure the United States complies with international legal obligations 
to refugees.  It expressly incorporated a lower standard for credible fear in-
terviews than for full asylum eligibility,141 providing that an individual 
should pass the screening as long as they have a “significant possibility” of 
eligibility for asylum.142 
The legislative history confirms an intention to ensure bona fide asylum 
seekers’ access to protection.  The Judiciary Committee report to the House 
version of the bill explained that: 
 Under this system, there should be no danger that an alien with 
a genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.  The initial 
screening, which should take place in the form of a confidential 
interview, will focus on two questions: is the alien telling the truth; 
and does the alien have some characteristic that would qualify the 
alien as a refugee.  As in other cases, the asylum officer should 
attempt to elicit all facts relevant to the applicant’s claim.143 
Senator Hatch, a principal sponsor of the Senate bill, described the credible 
fear interview as governed by a low screening standard.  He explained: 
 The credible fear standard applied at the screening stage would 
be whether, taking into account the alien’s credibility, there is a 
significant possibility that the alien would be eligible for asylum.  
The Senate bill had provided for a determination of whether the 
asylum claim was “manifestly unfounded,” while the House bill 
applied a “significant possibility” standard coupled with an inquiry 
into whether there was a substantial likelihood that the alien’s 
statements were true.  The conference report struck a compromise 
by rejecting the higher standard of credibility included in the House 
bill.  The standard adopted in the conference report is intended to 
                                                          
Id. § 1252(e)(2).  In Castro v. United States Department of Homeland Security, the Third Circuit 
ruled that this provision prohibited review of an underlying credible fear decision and that such 
prohibition did not violate the Suspension Clause.  835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016).  The Ninth Circuit 
recently reached the opposite conclusion on the constitutional issue, holding that the provision vio-
lated the Suspension Clause.  Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1119 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (“[W]e hold that § 1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause as applied to Thuraissi-
giam, although we do not profess to decide in this opinion what right or rights Thuraissigiam may 
vindicate via use of the writ.”).  The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari in Thuraissigiam, 
which remains pending before it.  Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019). 
 141.  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
 142.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (defining “credible fear of persecution” as “a significant possibility, 
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim 
and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum 
under section 1158 of this title”).  
 143.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 158 (1996) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, 
at 36 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
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be a low screening standard for admission into the usual full asy-
lum process.144 
Although the selection of a “significant possibility” standard reflects a 
higher threshold than one that screens out only “manifestly unfounded” 
claims, the credible fear standard was explicitly designed to be “low”: ensur-
ing that individuals who could eventually establish asylum eligibility would 
be allowed a full adjudication of their claims in regular removal proceedings.  
As mentioned above, the well-founded fear standard for full asylum eligibil-
ity itself requires only a one in ten chance of persecution, rendering a signif-
icant possibility of a well-founded fear quite minimal.145 
The DHS has also recognized credible fear as involving a low screening 
threshold in agency guidance and official documents.146  In issuing interim 
rules for the implementation of IIRIRA, the then-Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (“INS”) and Executive Office of Immigration Review charac-
terized the credible fear standard as “set[ting] a low threshold of proof of 
potential entitlement to asylum”—recognizing that many individuals “who 
have passed the credible fear standard will not ultimately be granted asy-
lum.”147  As understood by the agency at the time, the standard would 
properly function to favor screening any individuals with a bona fide claim, 
even if allowing “many” to apply for asylum who are ultimately denied. 
Senator Hatch further explained that the structure of asylum screening 
at the border, conducted by trained and specialized asylum officers under su-
pervisory guidance, would prevent the possibility of erroneous decisionmak-
ing: 
 Under the conference report, screening would be done by fully-
trained asylum officers supervised by officers who have not only 
had comparable training but have also had substantial experience 
adjudicating asylum applications.  This should prevent the poten-
tial that was in the terrorism bill provisions for erroneous decisions 
by lower level immigration officials at points of entry.148 
                                                          
 144.  142 CONG. REC. 25,347 (1996) (emphasis added).  
 145.  Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
 146.  Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct 
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (Mar. 6, 1997) (stating 
that credible fear is “a low threshold of proof of potential entitlement to asylum,” the purpose of 
which is to ensure access to a full hearing for all individuals who have such potential entitlement).  
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) Guidance previously also recog-
nized that Congress meant for a significant possibility to be “a low screening standard for admission 
into the usual full asylum process.”  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER 
BASIC TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK: CREDIBLE FEAR 11 (2006). 
 147.  Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct 
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320.  
 148.  142 CONG. REC. 25,347 (1996). 
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In the final version of the statute, Congress took the effort both to re-
quire that screenings be conducted by an asylum officer,149 and to define that 
term for the first time.  The expedited removal statute itself specifies that: 
 As used in this paragraph, the term “asylum officer” means an 
immigration officer who— 
 (i) has had professional training in country conditions, asylum 
law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to full-
time adjudicators of applications under section 1158 of this title, 
and 
 (ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described 
in clause (i) and has had substantial experience adjudicating asy-
lum applications.150 
The statutory text thus mandates an adjudicating official with special-
ized training in not only substantive law but also background country condi-
tions of refugee-sending countries and interviewing techniques.  Moreover, 
it specifies that these officers be supervised by trained officers with a body 
of experience adjudicating asylum claims.  These features likely render the 
Trump Administration’s current plan to have Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) conduct screenings illegal, as described in the following section, 
which also explores the history and structure of the asylum office. 
C.  Structure of Asylum Decisionmaking at the Border and Beyond 
As Senator Hatch stressed, the current scheme places credible fear ad-
judications under the auspices of specially trained asylum officers.  The asy-
lum office was established in 1990 via regulations implementing the 1980 
Refugee Act.151  Those regulations took affirmative asylum cases (those filed 
by individuals not in proceedings) away from general INS examiners who 
had adjudicated a range of immigrant benefits, giving them instead to asylum 
specialists.152  The  regulations also ensured that immigration judges would 
continue to hear asylum and withholding claims of individuals in proceed-
ings.153 
                                                          
 149.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“An asylum officer shall conduct interviews of aliens 
referred under subparagraph (A)(ii), either at a port of entry or at such other place designated by the 
Attorney General.”). 
 150.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(E).   
 151.  See Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 30,674, 30,676 (Jul. 27, 1990).  In formal documents, the office is referred to as the Asylum 
Division, but I use the more common phrase “asylum office” throughout this article.  
 152.  Id.; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The 
Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482–83 (2007). 
 153.  Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 
at 30,675.   
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The 1980 Refugee Act enacted the core refugee definition and a struc-
ture for adjudication of overseas refugee claims;154 however, it gave little 
guidance on the process for hearing asylum claims in the United States.  The 
1990 regulations reflected ten years of debate, during which the then-INS155 
considered many differing visions for the proper adjudication system, includ-
ing both adversarial and non-adversarial models.  As the agency explained, 
the creation of a non-adversarial and specialized corps reflected “[a] funda-
mental belief that the granting of asylum is inherently a humanitarian act dis-
tinct from the normal operation and administration of the immigration pro-
cess; and a recognition of the essential need for an orderly and fair system 
for the adjudication of asylum claims.”156  Although the 1980 Refugee Act 
itself did not mandate creation of the asylum corps, in 1996 Congress formal-
ized the corps’ existence via IIRIRA, which required that asylum officers 
conduct credible fear interviews.157 
In 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the asylum corps be-
came part of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) within 
the newly created DHS.158  Officers in the corps specialize in asylum claims 
and hear them exclusively.  They need not be attorneys—although many 
are—and all officers receive an intensive course and ongoing weekly training 
on a range of issues.159  Training topics include substantive law, procedure, 
country conditions, and interviewing techniques specific to refugees.160  A 
resource information bank allows officers ready access to information about 
human rights conditions throughout the world.161 
                                                          
 154.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 155.  The INS was dissolved in 2003.  Most of its functions are now carried out by the USCIS, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”).  See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195–96; see 
also Did You Know?: The INS No Longer Exists, USCIS: BEACON (Apr. 13, 2011), 
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/04/did-you-know-ins-no-longer-exists. 
 156.  Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 
at 30,675.   
 157.   See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text. 
 158.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195–96. 
 159.  Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility, and the Adversarial Adju-
dication of Claims for Asylum, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 468 (2016); Heidi Boas, Tips from a 
Former Asylum Officer, ASYLUMIST (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.asylumist.com/2018/03/21/tips-
from-a-former-asylum-officer (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (“Asylum officers are required to undergo 
an extensive six-week training program in asylum law, and pass exams before adjudicating asylum 
cases.  In addition, they continue receiving weekly training throughout their tenure at the asylum 
office.”). 
 160.  See Boas, supra note 159; see also Doris Meissner et al., The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: 
Charting a Way Forward, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/re-
search/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward.  
 161.  See Boas, supra note 159. 
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The office hears asylum merits applications received through the affirm-
ative process, in addition to conducting credible fear interviews for individ-
uals in expedited removal.  It does not handle defensive applications—that 
is, those filed by individuals in removal proceedings.162  Eight asylum office 
jurisdictions adjudicate claims throughout the United States, with most of-
fices serving several states.163  In 2018, the asylum office received over 
99,000 credible fear case referrals,164 up from 5047 in 2008.165  In 2017, the 
office also received nearly 140,000 affirmative applications.166  If the asylum 
office declines to grant a merits case and the applicant is out of status, the 
office refers the case to the immigration courts, where the individual will 
have a chance to apply for asylum again in defensive posture.167  
Despite the considerable adjudicatory experience and expertise of the 
asylum corps, their decisions—even for full merits cases—do not result in 
legal precedent.  Rather than placing precedent decisional authority within 
                                                          
 162.  8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a)(b) (2019) (setting forth jurisdiction of asylum office over applications 
for asylum by individuals not in removal proceedings and of immigration court over applicants who 
have been served with a notice to appear in immigration court or related document); see also Ob-
taining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (de-
scribing difference between affirmative and defensive asylum applications).  Of note, the asylum 
office also lacks jurisdiction over merits cases of individuals with reinstated prior removal orders, 
that is, individuals who unlawfully entered the United States after having been issued a removal 
order, including an expedited removal order.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(c)(2).  The DHS can only rein-
state prior orders for individuals who unlawfully enter; not those who present at ports of entry. 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.  If such individuals are apprehended by immigration 
authorities after unlawful entry and claim a fear of return to their home country, they receive a 
“reasonable fear interview” rather than a credible fear interview—a screening interview for thresh-
old eligibility for withholding of removal or Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.  If 
they pass, they are placed into “withholding only” proceedings before an immigration judge in 
which they can apply for withholding of removal and protection under CAT, but not asylum.  See 
Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 163.  See USCIS Service and Office Locator, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,  
https://egov.uscis.gov/office-locator/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).  The offices are Arlington, VA; 
Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New York, NY; Newark, NJ; and San 
Francisco, CA.  Id.   
 164.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT 
SUMMARY (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED_CFandRFstats09302018.pdf. 
 165.  Credible Fear Cases Completed and Referrals for Credible Fear Interview, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/reading-
room/RFA/credible-fear-cases-interview (last updated Apr. 29, 2019). 
 166.  OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW 
REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2017, at 7 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/pub-
lications/Refugees_Asylees_2017.pdf. 
167. ASYLUM DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 26 (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AAPM-2016.pdf (“The 
Asylum Office must refer to the Immigration Court for adjudication in removal proceedings an 
applicant who is ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum and appears inadmissible or deporta-
ble at the time the decision is issued.”).  
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the asylum office or elsewhere in DHS, the immigration laws provide that 
the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all 
questions of law shall be controlling.”168  The precedent asylum decisions of 
the BIA and the Attorney General, arising from “defensive claims” raised in 
removal proceedings, apply to asylum officers in merits adjudications—and, 
as described in more detail in Section V.B. below, have also been applied in 
credible fear proceedings. 
The BIA, created in 1940, is a delegatee of the Attorney General.169  The 
BIA hears appeals from immigration judge decisions and may decide those 
appeals and may issue precedent decisions.170  Although regulations charge 
the BIA with providing “clear and uniform guidance to the Service, the im-
migration judges, and the general public,”171 the Attorney General can also 
override the BIA via a certification process.  Namely, under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(h), the Attorney General has authority to direct the BIA to refer its 
cases to them for their own adjudication.172  Finally, the United States Courts 
of Appeals review removal decisions of both the Attorney General and the 
BIA.173 
In 2019, the Trump Administration announced and implemented a new 
policy allowing CBP agents to conduct credible fear interviews.174 Such ac-
tion likely runs afoul of statutory language, intent, and design—which as ex-
                                                          
 168.  8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012).  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”) created the 
Department of Homeland Security and transferred to it immigration functions previously within the 
Department of Justice including enforcement and benefits.  See Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(2002).  However, the Act specifically provided for the Attorney General to retain: 
[S]uch authorities and functions under this chapter and all other laws relating to the im-
migration and naturalization of aliens as were exercised by the Executive Office for Im-
migration Review, or by the Attorney General with respect to the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, on the day before the effective date of the [HSA]. 
8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1). 
 169.  Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 
(Sept. 4, 1940); Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the 
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 461 (2007) (“[W]hen the BIA decides a case, it is 
acting as an agent of the Attorney General.”).  
 170.  See 8 C.F.R. §1003.1 (2019).  
 171.  See id. §1003.1(d)(1). 
 172.  Id. §1003.1(h).  
 173.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (5). 
 174.  See Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border Security and Restore Integ-
rity to Our Immigration System, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1–2 (Apr. 29, 2019); HUMAN 
RIGHTS FIRST, ALLOWING CBP TO CONDUCT CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEWS UNDERMINES 
SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT REFUGEES (2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/de-
fault/files/CBP_Credible_Fear.pdf (concluding CBP officers are not equipped to conduct screening 
of asylum seekers, and that such action would violate regulation); Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol 
Agents, Rather Than Asylum Officers, Interviewing Families for “Credible Fear,” L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-19/border-patrol-inter-
view-migrant-families-credible-fear (reporting on implementation of CBP credible fear interviews). 
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plained above, require that specialized, trained, and experienced asylum of-
ficers conduct screenings.175  Despite the administration’s rushed attempt to 
provide training to CBP agents,176 the agency’s enforcement-orientation and 
documented record of abuses against migrants render it ill-suited to conduct 
non-adversarial and sensitive screenings.177  This is especially so given prac-
tical limitations and challenges in border screenings, explored below. 
D.  Practical Limitations in Asylum Adjudication via Expedited 
Removal 
The low screening threshold in expedited removal, properly construed, 
takes into consideration structural and practical limits presented in screening 
interviews.  Although trained asylum officers conduct credible fear inter-
views, they do so in constrained and chaotic conditions.  Many interviews 
take place telephonically, with no ability for the adjudicator and the applicant 
to establish in-person rapport.178  The interviews are not recorded, and inter-
pretation problems plague the process, such that asylum seekers often receive 
inadequate or no interpretation in their primary language.179  Moreover, reg-
ulations provide no guarantee of participation by attorneys, even for individ-
uals lucky enough to secure counsel within days of making it to the United 
States.  Rather, regulations state only that attorneys provided at no cost to the 
government “may” be present at interviews.180  In curtailed review hearings 
of cases in which the asylum officer finds no credible fear, immigration 
judges also often limit the role of attorneys, as an immigration court policy 
manual expressly denies a right to counsel to credible fear applicants.181 
                                                          
 175.  See supra note 174; see also supra Section I.E. 
 176.  See Yegenah Torbati, et. al., U.S. Will Assign Dozens of Border Agents to Migrant Asylum 
Interviews, REUTERS (May 9, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigra-
tion/u-s-will-assign-dozens-of-border-agents-to-migrant-asylum-interviews-idUSKCN1SF2N0. 
 177.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 174, at 2 (“Border Patrol agents have repeat-
edly used excessive force in encounters with migrants, threatened unaccompanied children, and 
some have pressured refugees who have crossed the border to not apply for asylum. . . . Some CBP 
officers have openly expressed skepticism of asylum claims . . . .”). 
 178.  INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: FAMILIES AND UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN 68–69 (2015), 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf. 
 179.  See, e.g., COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, FAMILY IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION: WHY THE PAST CANNOT BE PROLOGUE 38 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/administrative/immigration/FamilyDetentionReport2015.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
FAMILY DETENTION: STILL HAPPENING, STILL DAMAGING 11–12 (2015), http://www.human-
rightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-family-detention-still-happening.pdf.  
 180.  8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) (2019) (stating that attorneys “may be present at the interview and 
may be permitted, in the discretion of the asylum officer, to present a statement at the end of the 
interview”). 
 181.  A policy memorandum states that “[t]here is no right to representation prior to or during 
the [credible fear] review.”  MICHAEL J. CREPPY, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERIM OPERATING POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMORANDUM 97-3: 
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As scholars and commentators have noted, the above conditions impede 
the ability of individuals to present their claims.182  The structural limitations 
of the interview itself are compounded by detention of individuals throughout 
expedited removal proceedings.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) keeps both families and adult asylum seekers detained during credi-
ble fear processes in jail-like conditions that pose a risk to both physical and 
mental health.183  Asylum seekers, moreover, often experience extreme dep-
rivation, sexual abuse, and physical violence during their migration journeys, 
and many suffer trauma from past persecution.184 
Despite these documented issues, the Trump Administration has sought 
to expand these curtailed processes to their furthest reach.185  As I argue in 
Part VI below, structural and practical limitations of expedited removal 
should inform implementation of the credible fear standard.  But first, I turn 
to the framework for judicial review of agency decisionmaking in the next 
Part. 
III.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-BASED ASYLUM: AN OVERVIEW 
Since the passage of the Refugee Act, both DOJ and DHS have articu-
lated official positions on the viability of asylum claims based on domestic 
violence.  Whereas DOJ’s views have varied widely, DHS has expressed 
largely consistent official recognitions of these claims.  I delve into the views 
of each agency below. 
                                                          
PROCEDURES FOR CREDIBLE FEAR AND CLAIMED STATUS REVIEWS 10 (1997), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/07/97-3.pdf. 
 182.  See, e.g., Michele R. Pistone and John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the 
Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167 (2006); COMM’N 
ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 179, at 38. 
 183.  Reports documenting human rights abuses in ICE detention centers are legion.  See, e.g., 
AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA (2009), 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf; DET. WATCH 
NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2012), https://www.detentionwatchnet-
work.org/pressroom/reports/2012/expose-and-close; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF 
ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON (2009), https://www.human-
rightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf; KAREN 
TUMLIN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS (2009), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/A-
Broken-System-2009-07.pdf; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR 
ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (2015), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf; US: Deaths in Immi-
gration Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 7, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/07/us-deaths-immigration-detention. 
 184.  See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 60–61, 68–69 (2005), 
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf. 
 185.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining expanded application of expedited 
removal to inadmissible individuals in the United States for less than two years, irrespective of 
geographic location of apprehension).   
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A.  DOJ Position Through the Years 
In the years following the passage of the Refugee Act, the Department 
of Justice began to recognize—albeit in fits and starts—the legitimacy of asy-
lum protections for women seeking asylum from gender-based persecu-
tion.186  It has approved these claims largely but not exclusively by finding 
persecution on account of particular social group, which is one of the five 
grounds for asylum along with race, religion, nationality, and political opin-
ion.  Indeed, in defining particular social group for the first time in Matter of 
Acosta,187 the BIA in 1985 explained that “sex” could be a defining charac-
teristic that met its newly-articulated standard for social group.188  That test 
required the group to be defined around fundamental or immutable charac-
teristics that an applicant either could not change or should not be forced to 
change. 
In Matter of Kasinga,189 the BIA in 1996 held for the first time that a 
woman could establish asylum protections for gender-based harms, granting 
asylum to a young woman from Togo fleeing female genital cutting 
(“FGC”).190  The BIA held the practice of FGC against a woman’s will con-
stituted persecution, and recognized a social group rooted in gender, nation-
ality, tribal membership, and opposition to the practice.  It also held that the 
record established the harm was on account of her membership in the pro-
posed social group, based on evidence of societal context and gendered social 
norms.191 
In 1999, however, the BIA denied protection to Rody Alvarado Peña, a 
Guatemalan survivor of domestic violence who also raised a gender-based 
asylum claim.192  The BIA there issued a divided precedent decision, Matter 
of R-A-,193 reversing the immigration judge’s grant of asylum.194  Ms. Al-
varado had suffered years of physical, emotional, and sexual violence by her 
husband, which she claimed was based on her gender, her relationship status, 
and the gendered beliefs of her persecutor.195  The BIA did not question that 
                                                          
 186.  See generally Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Re-
sistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 
29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46 (2010) (discussing the development of domestic violence-based asylum 
in the United States).   
 187.  19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 188.  Id. at 233. 
 189.  21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 190.  Id. at 358. 
 191.  Id. at 365–68. 
 192.  See Matter of R-A-, CTR FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-
work/matter-r-a- (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (explaining case background and identifying Ms. Al-
varado).  
 193.  R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 908–910. 
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the abuse she suffered was horrific or severe.  It ruled, however, that Ms. 
Alvarado failed to establish persecution on account of membership in a par-
ticular social group.196  Specifically, it rejected the proposed group of “Gua-
temalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male 
companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination”—
accepted by the immigration judge below—because the group was not “rec-
ognized and understood to be a societal faction.”197  It also held that Ms. 
Alvarado did not show nexus to—or persecution “on account of”—her mem-
bership in this social group.198 
Matter of R-A- drew immediate criticism and resulted in a series of 
agency actions.199 In 2000, the DOJ under Attorney General Janet Reno is-
sued proposed regulations to address claims such as Ms. Alvarado’s.200  A 
long background section discussed the viability of gender-based asylum and 
the DOJ’s disagreement with the BIA in R-A-.  The DOJ explained that the 
proposed rule was designed to “remove[] certain barriers that the [Matter of] 
R-A- decision seems to pose to claims that domestic violence, against which 
a government is either unwilling or unable to provide protection, rises to the 
level of persecution of a person on account of membership in a particular 
social group.”201  After issuing the proposed regulations, Attorney General 
Reno in 2001 certified the BIA’s decision to herself and vacated it, remand-
ing back to the BIA with instructions to stay the case while regulations re-
mained pending.202 
Regulations, however, never issued under Attorney General Reno’s 
watch, and in 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft intervened and ordered 
the parties to brief the case.203  Rather than issuing a decision, he sent it back 
to the BIA in 2005, with instructions to reconsider the case under final regu-
lations when they issued.  To date, however, no regulations have issued,204 
and in 2008, Attorney General Mukasey vacated the stay and ordered the BIA 
                                                          
 196.  Id. at 918–19. 
 197.  Id. at 918.  
 198.  The BIA also rejected Ms. Alvarado’s claim of asylum based on political opinion.  See id. 
at 916–17. 
 199.  See Musalo, supra note 186, at 58. 
 200.  Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
 201.  Id. at.76,589.  The DOJ noted that rather than attempt a “universal model for persecution 
claims based on domestic violence,” it has instead opted for a rule that states “generally applicable 
principles that will allow for case-by-case adjudication of claims based on domestic violence.”  Id.  
 202.  R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906. 
 203.  See  R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 629 (A.G. 2008) (“On February 21, 2003, Attorney General 
Ashcroft certified the Board’s decision for review but remanded the case on January 19, 2005, again 
directing the Board to reconsider its decision ‘in light of the final rule.’” (quoting R-A-, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005)).  
 204.  The Obama Administration did state its intent to issue new proposed regulations in 2010 
but failed to do so.  See Regulatory Plan, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,137 (Dec. 7, 2009); Asylum and With-
holding Definition, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,220, 64,220–21 (Dec. 7, 2009). 
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to reconsider the case.205  The BIA remanded to the immigration judge, and 
in 2009, the immigration judge granted asylum to Ms. Alvarado after both 
parties stipulated to a grant.206  Thus, Ms. Alvarado’s case was favorably re-
solved after almost a decade, but with no guiding precedent for agency adju-
dicators. 
Finally, in 2014 the BIA issued a precedent decision, Matter of A-R-C-
G-,207 providing guidance on the viability of domestic violence asylum 
claims.208  The BIA in A-R-C-G- recognized a social group of “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”209  As in 
Kasinga, the BIA examined social and cultural context in assessing the 
group.  It applied its newly articulated three-part test for social group—de-
veloped in 2014 to require that a group be “particular” and “socially distinct” 
in addition to immutable or fundamental.210  In considering these new prongs, 
the BIA cited “societal expectations about gender and subordination” and a 
culture of “machismo and family violence” in Guatemala.211  Matter of A-R-
C-G- was thus a clear acknowledgement of the gender dynamics of persecu-
tion against women, including in intimate partnerships and within a family 
home. 
B.  DHS Position Through the Years 
Although DHS originally opposed the grant of asylum to Ms. Alvarado 
before the BIA in 1999, since the mid-2000s DHS has taken an overall con-
sistent official position before the BIA and Attorney General recognizing the 
viability of domestic violence asylum claims.  In its 2005 briefing before At-
torney General Ashcroft, DHS argued that Ms. Alvarado had in fact estab-
lished asylum eligibility under the immigration laws, changing its prior posi-
tion in her case.212  In a 2009 BIA case called Matter of L-R-, DHS 
headquarters submitted a supplemental brief, requested by the BIA to specif-
ically address domestic violence asylum claims.  DHS argued that the BIA 
could accept as cognizable either the particular social group of “Mexican 
                                                          
 205.  R-A-, 24 I. & N. at 629. 
 206.  See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391–92 n.12 (B.I.A. 2014) (“In remanded proceedings, 
the parties stipulated that [Ms. Alvarado] was eligible for asylum.  Her application was granted on 
December 10, 2009.”).  
 207.  26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 208.  Id. at 391–92 & n.12. 
 209.  Id. at 389. 
 210.  Id. at 390–92. 
 211.  Id. at 393–94 (noting that “married woman’s inability to leave the relationship may be 
informed by societal expectations about gender and subordination, as well as legal constraints re-
garding divorce and separation” and that “the record in this case includes unrebutted evidence that 
Guatemala has a culture of ‘machismo and family violence’”).   
 212.  Brief for DHS on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 2, R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 
2005) (No. A 73 753 922), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-
%20DHS%20brief.pdf.   
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women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican 
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a do-
mestic relationship.”213  And in Matter of A-R-C-G-, DHS similarly argued 
that the proposed social group rooted in gender, nationality, and relationship 
status—“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship”—was cognizable.214 
Agency guidance also confirms the Department’s position on the viabil-
ity of domestic violence claims, even prior to Matter of Kasinga and Matter 
of R-A-.  A May 1995 guidance memorandum addressed to all asylum offices 
within INS instructed that “rape (including mass rape in, for example, Bos-
nia), sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation 
are forms of mistreatment primarily directed at girls and women and they 
may serve as evidence of past persecution on account of one or more of the 
five grounds.”215  More recent asylum officer training course materials have 
further elaborated on the viability of these claims.  For example, December 
2002 training guidance, citing to the 1995 INS guidelines, explains that do-
mestic violence claimants can meet various elements of asylum eligibility, 
including harm rising to the level of persecution, particular social group, and 
nexus.216 
C.  Court Decisions Through the Years 
The United States Courts of Appeals did not have the opportunity to 
apply Chevron to Matter of A-R-C-G- prior to the BIA decision’s vacatur and 
reversal by former Attorney General Sessions.217  In several cases, however, 
the courts reviewed the agency’s application of Matter of A-R-C-G- in do-
mestic violence asylum cases.  In so doing, the federal courts upheld and 
reversed denials of domestic-violence-based asylum in cases that the agency 
                                                          
 213.  Supplemental Brief for DHS at 14, L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), https://cgrs.uchas-
tings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf. 
 214.  A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390 (“DHS now concedes the respondent established that she 
suffered past harm rising to the level of persecution and that the persecution was on account of a 
particular social group comprised of ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship.’”).  
 215.  PHYLLIS COVEN, OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
ASYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS FROM WOMEN (1995), reprinted in 7 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 700, 703–04 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 216.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE 
PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK: FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS 
(2002). 
 217.  Notably, in asylum and withholding appeals to federal circuit courts brought by individual 
petitioners, the DOJ Office of Immigration Litigation represents the agency itself, and thus defends 
the decisions of the BIA.  See Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/civil/office-immigration-litigation (last updated Oct. 20, 2014).  Asylum 
applicant petitioners raising domestic violence asylum claims, meanwhile, had an interest in chal-
lenging the application of Matter of A-R-C-G- to deny them protection, but not the validity of Matter 
of A-R-C-G- itself.  
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had deemed distinguishable from Matter of A-R-C-G-.  In an unpublished 
Ninth Circuit case, for example, the applicant raised an A-R-C-G--type social 
group of Honduran women in a relationship they are unable to leave.  The 
BIA had held that the applicant was in fact able to leave her relationship; 
however, the circuit court reversed, determining that the BIA’s conclusion 
was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the abuser’s continuing 
violence and stalking.218  In a published Sixth Circuit case, the court reached 
the opposite conclusion on a similar issue, upholding the agency’s determi-
nation that the petitioner was able to leave her relationship because she 
moved freely about her country and avoided her abuser.219 
Outside the intimate partner violence context, the courts have recog-
nized the viability of a range of gender-based asylum claims, including other 
forms of persecution that take place within a family home.  In doing so, fed-
eral courts have analyzed the underlying gender norms that cause and enable 
persecution.  In Sarhan v. Holder,220 for example, the Seventh Circuit exam-
ined the gendered societal context of “honor killings” of women by their fam-
ily members under the particular social group ground, concluding that: 
The social group in this case . . . is a function of a pre-existing 
moral code in Jordanian society . . . . Social stigma causes the vio-
lence.  Society as a whole brands women who flout its norms as 
outcasts, and it delegates to family members the task of meting out 
the appropriate punishment—in this case, death.221 
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the agency’s reasoning that the perse-
cutor—the applicant’s brother—acted out of personal motivations, rather 
than on account of protected ground: 
There is no personal dispute between Disi [the petitioner] and her 
brother [Besem].  He has not vowed to kill her because of a quarrel 
about whether she or Besem should inherit a parcel of land, or be-
cause she did a bad job running his store, or because she broke 
Besem’s favorite toy as a child.  She faces death because of a 
widely-held social norm in Jordan—a norm that imposes behav-
ioral obligations on her and permits Besem to enforce them in the 
most drastic way.  The dispute between Disi and Besem is simply 
a piece of a complex cultural construct that entitles male members 
of families dishonored by perceived bad acts of female relatives to 
                                                          
 218.   Alvarado-Garcia v. Lynch, 665 F. App’x 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 219.  Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 291 (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding agency denial where 
substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that applicant was in fact able to leave her 
relationship where there were no continued stalking and abuse, unlike applicant in Matter of A-R-
C-G-); see also Vega–Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016) (upholding agency denial of 
protection to woman who claimed asylum based on domestic violence but never lived with her 
abuser, unlike the applicant in Matter of A-R-C-G-). 
 220.  658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 221.  Id. at 655. 
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kill those women. . . . The very fact that these are called “honor 
killings” demonstrates that they are killings with broader social 
significance.222 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis wholly rejects any notion that the gen-
der-based persecution of women fails if an applicant has a relationship with 
her persecutor.  Other circuits have also recognized the viability of honor 
killing or forced marriage claims, as well as claims rooted in incest or familial 
abuse due to sexual orientation—contexts that inherently involve some rela-
tionship of the applicant to her persecutor.223  And, in Perdomo v. Holder,224 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that a social group based on gender and nation-
ality alone might be cognizable, reversing the agency’s cursory rejection of 
the proposed social group of “women in Guatemala.”225  The court remanded 
to the agency for a case-specific assessment of that social group in the context 
of the applicant’s fear of femicide, or the gender-motivated killing of 
women.226 
These cases demonstrate that the federal courts of appeals do broadly 
recognize that persecution of women for being women falls within the scope 
of refugee protection.  Harms perpetrated by individuals with relational ties 
to a woman applicant—be they intimate partners, siblings, or parents—are 
not exempted.  Yet, as discussed in Part V, the DOJ under President Trump 
took on this growing consensus around gender-based refugee protections, us-
ing agency interpretive authority in an attempt to reverse course on these 
claims. 
IV.  THE BORDER UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP: POLITICIZATION AND 
CONSTANT CRISIS 
The Matter of A-B- decision, which I will discuss in detail shortly, did 
not take place in a vacuum.  Rather, it was part of a broader narrative adopted 
by the Trump Administration of a nation under threat—specifically from asy-
lum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border.  Below, I provide a non-exhaustive 
overview of executive actions that overtly politicize the concept of “the bor-
der.”   
Over December 2017 and January 2018, President Trump caused a gov-
ernment shutdown in an attempt to force Congress to provide $5.7 billion in 
                                                          
 222.  Id. at 656. 
 223.  Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1056, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017) (incest commit-
ted against gay petitioner); Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017) (honor killing 
claim); Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 604, 608 (6th Cir. 2010) (forced marriage claim); Nabulwala 
v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 1115, 1117–18 (8th Cir. 2007) (familial abuse of lesbian-identified peti-
tioner).  
 224.  611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 225.  Id. at 667–69. 
 226.  Id. at 669. 
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funding for his border wall.227  His brinksmanship failed, and he reopened 
the government after a record thirty-five days of closure—during which time 
over 380,000 federal workers went without pay.228  Thousands of federal 
workers lined up at food banks and many more struggled to pay medical bills 
and rent.229  In total, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the shutdown 
caused $11 billion in lost GDP over two quarters, $3 billion of which will 
never be recovered—as well as lasting indirect economic harms.230  Success-
ful funding negotiations post-shutdown resulted in legislation providing 
President Trump with $1.37 billion for his wall, but this was not enough: 
President Trump signed the bill, but denounced it as inadequate.231  On Feb-
ruary 15, 2019, he accordingly declared a national emergency in order to di-
vert nearly $7 billion in federal funds, primarily from the Department of De-
fense, for his wall.232 Even as litigation against that diversion of funds 
continues, 233 the Pentagon recently announced plans to divert an additional 
$3.8 billion for the wall.234 
Earlier in fall 2018, President Trump attempted to ban individuals from 
asylum eligibility if they crossed unlawfully into territory between ports of 
                                                          
 227.  Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Emily Cochrane, Government Shuts Down as Talks Fail to Break 
Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/us/politics/trump-
shutdown-border-wall.html.  Although the House passed a bill for continuing three weeks of fund-
ing for the government, President Trump’s stated refusal to sign a bill without the requested border 
wall funding derailed its passage in the Senate, as Senate Leader Mitch McConnell refused to bring 
a funding bill to vote without President Trump’s approval.  See id.   
 228.  See Bob Bryan, The Government Shutdown Is in Day 35 and Has Shattered the Record for 
the Longest Shutdown in History, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/history-of-government-shutdowns-in-congress-2018-1. 
 229.  Ian Stewart, As Shutdown Continues, Thousands of Federal Workers Visit D.C. Area Pop-
Up Food Banks, NPR (Jan. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/13/684824384/as-
shutdown-continues-thousands-of-federal-workers-visit-d-c-area-pop-up-food-ba. 
 230.  Kate Davidson, CBO: Shutdown Will Cost Government $3 Billion of Projected 2019 GDP, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cbo-shutdown-will-cost-government-3-
billion-of-projected-2019-gdp-11548688574. 
 231.  Peter Baker, Trump Declares National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-
trump.html. 
 232.  Id.  
 233.  See Sierra Club v. Trump: Border Wall Injunction, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000995 (last updated Nov. 13, 2019, 
11:37 AM) (consolidating the related cases on appeal from the Northern District of California).  
Although the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a permanent 
injunction against construction of the border wall using diverted funds, the Supreme Court granted 
a stay of the injunction pending litigation.  Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (order granting 
stay of permanent injunction).  
 234.  Emily Cochrane, Administration to Divert Billions from Pentagon to Fund Border Wall, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/border-wall-funds-
pentagon.html. 
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entry.235  The immigration laws on this point, however, clearly allow for asy-
lum status irrespective of manner of entry.236  In less than two weeks, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a 
nationwide temporary restraining order against the policy.237 
Also in fall 2018, President Trump took the dramatic and unprecedented 
step of sending some 5000 military troops to the U.S.-Mexico border to meet 
the “threat” of a migrant caravan.238  Human rights researchers documented 
that the vast majority of individuals were men, women, children, and families 
fleeing violence and humanitarian crises—yet President Trump persisted in 
characterizing them as “stone cold criminals” mounting an invasion of the 
country.239  Given the military’s lack of jurisdiction to enforce immigration 
laws, the episode largely amounted to an expensive political stunt, as the de-
ployed troops could not permissibly take direct action against migrants.240  
The troops instead provided primarily logistical support to immigration of-
ficers at the border.241  Although some were soon recalled, in February 2019, 
President Trump ordered an additional 3750 servicepersons to the border, 
bringing the total up to 6000 active military troops.242 
In summer 2018, the Trump Administration under former Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions implemented the widely-condemned practice of family 
separation.243  Under Attorney General Sessions’s “zero tolerance” policies, 
the DOJ criminally prosecuted asylum-seeker parents who crossed the border 
                                                          
 235.  Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for 
Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934, 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018); Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 57,661, 57,661–63 (Nov. 9, 2018). 
 236.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (providing that asylum may be granted to “[a]ny alien who 
is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States” and meets the eligi-
bility requirements). 
 237.  East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 238.  Alex Ward, The U.S. Is Sending 5,000 Troops to the Border. Here’s What They Can and 
Can’t Do, VOX (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/29/18026646/military-border-cara-
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 239.  Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, President Trump Calls Caravan Immigrants “Stone Cold 
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supra note 238; see also Kennji Kizuka, Debunking President Trump’s Tweets on the Migrant Car-
avan, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/debunking-presi-
dent-trumps-tweets-migrant-caravan. 
 240.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly au-
thorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force 
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than two years, or both.”).  
 241.  Ward, supra note 238. 
 242.  Matthew S. Schwartz, Pentagon Deploying 3,750 Troops to Southern Border, NPR (Feb. 
4, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/04/691222383/pentagon-deploying-3-750-
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 243.  Clara Long, The False Choice Between Family Separation and Detention, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (June 26, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/false-choice-between-
family-separation-and-detention. 
 
410 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:374 
unlawfully with their children;244 the families were driven to do so in large 
part due to U.S. Border Patrol’s refusal to process them at ports of entry.245  
DOJ separated children—including babies and toddlers—from their parents 
and sent the parents to federal criminal custody to await trial.  The children, 
meanwhile, were held in the custody of Office of Refugee Resettlement.  The 
public broadly condemned the cruelty of the policy,246 and the United States 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of California swiftly enjoined 
it.247  Under the policy, the government separated over five thousand immi-
grant children from their parents.248  In some cases, the separations were per-
manent.249 
In 2019, the administration began requiring thousands of asylum seekers 
processed at the southern border to wait in Mexico while their U.S. immigra-
tion court cases remained pending. 250  Under the policy, termed the “Migrant 
Protection Protocols,” the U.S. government has returned over 60,000 asylum 
seekers to Mexico to await their immigration court hearings, despite the sig-
nificant risks of trafficking, violence, and organized crime that migrants face 
                                                          
 244.  Fact Sheet on Family Separation for Asylum Seekers, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGR. 
NETWORK (2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/family-separation/fact-sheet-family-separation 
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 245.  See Fact Sheet on Family Separation, supra note 244.  The government also separated 
some asylum-seeker families presenting at ports of entry, sending the parents to adult ICE detention 
and the children to Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement cus-
tody, despite the fact that such presentation does not constitute a crime.  Id.  
 246.  See, e.g., Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks & Zoe Greenberg, Protests Across U.S. Call for End 
to Migrant Family Separations, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/trump-protests-family-separation.html.  
 247.  See Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 
2018).  
 248.  See Elliot Spagat, Tally of Children Split at Border Tops 5,400 in New Count, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 25, 2019), https://apnews.com/c654e652a4674cf19304a4a4ff599feb (reporting Trump 
Administration separated over 5400 children from parents since July 2017); see also Family Sepa-
ration by the Numbers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-
and-detention/family-separation (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (reporting over 2600 children separated 
in prior count).  Due to the failure of DOJ, DHS, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement to keep 
records linking the separated children and their parents, the process of reunification of some of the 
families dragged on for weeks and even months.  See id.  
 249.  See Family Separation by the Numbers, supra note 248.  The Trump Administration de-
ported the parents of over a hundred children before they could be reunified, and the families made 
the difficult decision for the children to stay in the United States to pursue their cases.  Id.  As of 
October 2018, approximately twenty-six children remained separated due to the government’s op-
position to reunification on unfitness or danger grounds.  Id. 
 250.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf; see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2)(C) (2012); Jason Kao & Denise Lu, How Trump’s Policies Are Leaving Thousands of 
Asylum Seekers Waiting in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/inter-
active/2019/08/18/us/mexico-immigration-asylum.html (reporting almost 32,000 individuals sub-
ject to return to Mexico under the policy as of August 2019).  
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there.251 Two courts have determined that the policy likely contravenes U.S. 
non-refoulement obligations in light of those risks, in addition to violating 
domestic immigration laws.252 
Also in 2019, the Trump Administration secured “Asylum Cooperative 
Agreements” with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.253 The agree-
ments, in conjunction with a new interim final rule, effectively bar Central 
American (and other) asylum seekers arriving by land at the U.S.-Mexico 
border from obtaining asylum in the United States, with only limited excep-
tions.254  Pursuant to the agreements and regulations, asylum seekers can be 
sent back to Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras and required to first seek 
asylum there, so long as they traveled through that country and are not a cit-
izen there.255  Such action almost certainly violates international and domes-
                                                          
 251.  See generally Molly O’Toole, Asylum Officers Rebel Against Trump Policies They Say Are 
Immoral and Illegal, LA TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/poli-
tics/story/2019-11-15/asylum-officers-revolt-against-trump-policies-they-say-are-immoral-illegal 
(“Since the Trump administration announced its Migrant Protection Protocols in December, U.S. 
officials have pushed roughly 60,000 asylum seekers back across the southern border to wait in 
places the State Department considers some of the most dangerous in the world . . . .”); “We Can’t 
Help You Here”: US Returns of Asylum Seekers to Mexico, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/07/02/we-cant-help-you-here/us-returns-asylum-seekers-mexico 
(documenting risks of serious crime, including sexual assault and kidnapping).  
 252.  A federal district court preliminarily enjoined the “Migrant Protection Protocols,” finding 
that domestic immigration statutes likely did not permit forced return to Mexico of asylum seekers 
and that the policy likely violated the government’s non-refoulement obligations.  See Innovation 
Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1123–27 (N.D. Cal. 2019).  The Ninth Circuit initially 
stayed the injunction, Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 2019), but 
ultimately agreed with the district court that the policy likely violated the immigration statutes and 
U.S. non-refoulement obligations.  Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, No. 19-15716, 2020 WL 964402 
(9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).  Although I served as counsel in this litigation, the views expressed herein 
are strictly mine alone.  
 253.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: DHS AGREEMENTS WITH GUATEMALA, 
HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/19_1003_opa_fact-sheet-agreements-northern-central-america-countries.pdf (discussing the 
“Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of 
Guatemala on Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims” (signed July 26, 2019), the 
“Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of 
El Salvador for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims” (signed Sept. 20, 2019), and 
the “Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic 
of Honduras for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims” (signed Sept. 25, 2019)).   
 254.  See Interim Final Rule: Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative 
Agreements Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,994, 63,994–96 (Nov. 19, 
2019) (explaining that the new regulation “bars an alien subject to [an Alternative Country Agree-
ment] from applying for asylum in the United States,” but that exceptions exist, including when an 
officer determines that allowing an individual to apply for asylum in the United States would be in 
the “public interest”).  
 255.  See id.  
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tic law, which permit such return to “third countries” only where those coun-
tries are safe and have functioning asylum systems.256  Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador all lack such systems, and are among the most dangerous 
countries in the world.257 This policy, too, has been challenged in court.258 
Throughout all these actions, the President has painted a picture of a 
border under siege from those seeking refuge.  His Twitter account, inter-
views, and speeches are littered with statements attacking asylum seekers. 
For example, he has asserted:  
“We shouldn’t be hiring judges by the thousands, as our ridiculous 
immigration laws demand, we should be changing our laws, build-
ing the Wall, hire Border Agents and Ice and not let people come 
into our country based on the legal phrase they are told to say as 
their password.”259   
*** 
“We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country.  When 
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or 
Court Cases, bring them back from where they came.  Our system 
is a mockery to good immigration policy and Law and Order.”260   
*** 
“I have instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security not to let 
these large Caravans of people into our Country.  It is a dis-
grace.”261   
*** 
“We have the worst immigration laws in the history of the world, 
okay?  So it’s a joke. . . . Somebody touches our land, we now take 
them to a court, to a judge.  They want us to choose 5,000 
                                                          
 256.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2012); Susan Gzesh, “Safe Third Country” Agreements with 
Mexico and Guatemala Would be Unlawful, JUST SECURITY (July 15, 2019), https://www.justsecu-
rity.org/64918/safe-third-country-agreements-with-mexico-and-guatemala-would-be-unlawful/. 
 257.   See, e.g., Gzesh, supra note 256 (“Guatemala would not provide protection from persecu-
tion for asylum seekers, nor can it provide a ‘full and fair’ procedure for determining asylum 
claims.”); Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, What the Safe Third Country Deals Mean for the Future of 
Asylum in the United States, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Oct. 4, 2019), https://immigrationim-
pact.com/2019/10/04/safe-third-country-deals-asylum/ (“Guatemala has just 8 employees in the 
agency responsible for hearing asylum applications.  El Salvador has just a single employee pro-
cessing asylum applications . . . . El Salvador has the world’s highest intentional homicide rate.  
Honduras is fourth, while Guatemala is 15th.”). 
 258.  See Complaint, U.T. v. Barr, No. 20-00116 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/complaint-ut-v-barr.   
 259.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 21, 2018, 5:12 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1009770941604298753. 
 260.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1010900865602019329. 
 261.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 23, 2018, 6:44 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/988413372298416128. 
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judges. . . . It’s crazy. . . . If they step on our land, we have judges.  
It’s insane.  So we’re going to have to change our whole immigra-
tion policy.”262 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions also expressed strong views against asy-
lum seekers, broadly questioning the legitimacy of their claims.  He cited 
“rampant abuse and fraud” and concluded, “[t]he system is being gamed.  The 
credible fear process . . . has become an easy ticket to illegal entry into the 
United States.”263  In a speech to a national convening of immigration judges, 
the same day he issued the Matter of A-B- decision, he pronounced, “the vast 
majority of the current asylum claims are not valid.”264  He asserted, “We can 
elevate the threshold standard of proof in credible fear interviews.”265  And, 
as described in Part V below, the Matter of A-B- decision was precisely the 
vehicle he used to attempt to do that. 
V.  MATTER OF A-B-: DECISION, IMPLEMENTATION, INJUNCTION 
A.  Matter of A-B- 
In December 2015, an immigration judge in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
issued a decision denying asylum to a Salvadoran woman, Ms. A.B., who had 
fled over fifteen years of domestic violence in her home country.  He did so 
despite the binding precedent issued by the BIA in August 2014 in Matter of 
A-R-C-G-, which recognized domestic violence as a basis for asylum.266  The 
BIA reversed his denial and took the unusual step of directing a grant of asy-
lum below so long as background checks cleared.267  Nevertheless, Ms. 
A.B.’s case remained unresolved due to the actions of the immigration judge 
on remand.  Instead of granting asylum as directed after security checks re-
turned, the immigration judge attempted to “certify” the case back to the BIA 
                                                          
 262.  Remarks at a Lunch with Republican Members of Congress and an Exchange with Report-
ers, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 11 (June 26, 2018). 
 263.  Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review. 
 264.  Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view Legal Training Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 11, 2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-re-
view-legal. 
 265.  Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view, supra note 263.  
 266.  A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390, 395 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 267.  Specifically, the BIA ordered that the case be remanded to the Immigration Judge “for the 
purpose of allowing [DHS] the opportunity to complete or update identity, law enforcement, or 
security investigations or examinations, and further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of 
an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h).”  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248 (A.G. 2018) 
(alteration in original) (quoting A-B-, at 4 (B.I.A. Dec. 8, 2016)). 
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without issuing a new decision—an unauthorized procedural mechanism that 
fell outside the scope of applicable regulations.268 
In March 2018, Attorney General Sessions personally intervened in the 
case, invoking 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).269  The DHS countenanced cau-
tion, moving for the Attorney General to suspend briefing in the case due to 
its defective procedural posture.270  In the alternative, DHS asked the Attor-
ney General to both clarify the scope of his intervention and to extend the 
parties’ briefing schedule.  DHS explained that it needed more time “due to 
the complexity of the issues involved in this matter and the need for extensive 
intra-Departmental coordination.”271  Attorney General Sessions denied the 
motion to suspend briefing despite recognizing “[t]he Immigration Judge did 
not act within his authority.”272  Attorney General Sessions also declined to 
issue any clarification, and permitted only a partial extension of time for 
briefing, not the full amount requested by the DHS.273 
On the merits, both Ms. A.B. and DHS submitted briefing in the case 
urging the Attorney General to uphold Matter of A-R-C-G-.  The Department 
opened its brief asserting, “The Department generally supports the legal 
framework set out by the Board in Matter of A-R-C-G- . . . for the adjudica-
tion of asylum and statutory withholding of removal applications premised 
on inter-partner domestic violence and the protected ground of membership 
in a particular social group.”274  
On June 11, 2018, the Attorney General issued a decision rejecting this 
view.  He overruled the prior BIA precedent in Matter of A-R-C-G- and also 
reversed the favorable decision of the BIA in Ms. A.B.’s own case.  Attorney 
                                                          
 268.  Id. at 248–49 (describing procedural history); see infra note 272 and accompanying text 
(explaining Attorney General Sessions’ conclusion that the procedural mechanism used by the im-
migration judge was defective).  
 269.  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 227 (A.G. 2018) (certification order); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 
317 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision); see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text (describing 
certification authority of the Attorney General). 
 270.  U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Motion on Certification to the Attorney General, A-B-, 27 I. 
& N. 316 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision) (on file with author).  DHS contended that invocation of 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) was not appropriate because jurisdiction for the case had never vested back to 
the BIA, as the immigration judge’s attempt to “certify” the case back to the BIA was procedurally 
defective.  See id. at 2; see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2019) (providing mechanism for the BIA 
to “refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General 
directs the Board to refer to him,” without referencing analogous mechanism for an immigration 
judge).  Attorney General Sessions agreed that the immigration judge’s actions were defective but, 
nevertheless, ruled that he himself had authority to certify a case still technically with the immigra-
tion judge.  See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321–22, n.2 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision) (noting “pro-
cedurally defective” action by Immigration Judge Couch); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248–49 (A.G. 
2018) (noting the same defective action). 
 271.  Motion on Certification to the Attorney General, supra note 270, at 4.  
 272.  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248 (A.G. 2018).  
 273.  See id. at 249–50. 
 274.  U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Brief on Referral to the Attorney General at 2, A-B-, 27 I. & 
N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (on file with author).  
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General Sessions’s decision relied heavily upon the BIA’s purported failure 
to engage in in-depth analysis in A-R-C-G-.  He criticized, in particular, the 
BIA’s reliance on concessions by DHS with regard to particular social groups 
and other legal issues in the case.275  Attorney General Sessions invoked his 
authority under the Chevron framework, concluding “the phrase ‘member-
ship in a particular social group’ is ambiguous”276 and emphasizing his own 
“primary responsibility for construing ambiguous provisions in the immigra-
tion laws.”277  His discussion of this authority cited the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
Negusie v. Holder, and Immigration & Naturalization Services. v. Aguirre-
Aguirre.278 
Yet, his decision went far beyond merely construing the term “particular 
social group,” to generally opine on facts and circumstances not present in 
Ms. A.B.’s case.  Among the more reaching aspects of his decision was its 
conclusion that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence 
or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for 
asylum”279—notwithstanding the fact the Ms. A.B. herself did not present a 
gang claim.  Attorney General Sessions additionally concluded in a footnote 
that “[a]ccordingly, few such claims would satisfy the legal standard to de-
termine whether an alien has a credible fear of persecution.”280 
The decision also muddled the long-established standard for failure of 
state protection against harm by non-state actors, which requires only that a 
home government be unable or unwilling to protect the individual.  As the 
BIA has previously noted, the “unable or unwilling” standard governed 
claims for refugee protection under U.S. law even prior to the passage of the 
Refugee Act.281  Under this standard, a refugee need show only either that 
her country of origin cannot effectively protect her, or that it is unwilling for 
                                                          
 275.  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334–35 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision). 
 276.  Id. at 326. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 326–27 (“The Attorney General’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous term in 
the Act, such as ‘membership in a particular social group,’ is entitled to deference.” (citing Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 
516 (2009); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999))).  
 279.  Id. at 320. 
 280.  Id. at 320 n.1 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012)).  
 281.  See  Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222–23 (B.I.A. 1985) (“We conclude that the pre-Refugee 
Act construction of ‘persecution’ should be applied to the term as it appears in section 101(a)(42)(A) 
of the Act.  It is a basic rule of statutory construction that words used in an original act or section, 
that are repeated in subsequent legislation with a similar purpose, are presumed to be used in the 
same sense in the subsequent legislation.” (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978))); 
id. at 222 (determining that one of the “significant aspects” of the “accepted construction of the term 
‘persecution’” was “harm or suffering had to be inflicted either by the government of a country or 
by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control”). 
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any reason to do so.282  Yet Attorney General Sessions articulated the stand-
ard as requiring the home government to “condone[]” or be “complete[ly] 
helpless[]” to protect an applicant against harm.283 
In perhaps the most disturbing part of his decision, Attorney General 
Sessions addressed nexus—the statutorily-required link between harm and 
one of the five protected grounds—in a manner that implicitly questioned the 
very viability of gender-based persecution claims, which, as explained above, 
often arise in the context of community, family, and partner relationships.284  
Unlike the term “particular social group,” the statute provides a clear defini-
tion for nexus, requiring that protected ground on which an individual is seek-
ing asylum be “one central reason” for persecution—a standard that permits 
mixed motives for harm.285  Attorney General Sessions, however, character-
ized domestic violence as personal harm beyond the reach of refugee protec-
tion.  He opined that “[w]hen private actors inflict violence based on a per-
sonal relationship with a victim, then the victim’s membership in a larger 
group may well not be ‘one central reason’ for the abuse.”286  He suggested 
that domestic violence survivors, as “victim[s] of private criminal activity,” 
may have difficulty in showing “that their persecutors harmed them on ac-
count of their membership in that group rather than for personal reasons.”287  
More simply, he stated, “An alien may suffer threats and violence in a foreign 
country for any number of reasons relating to her social, economic, family, 
or other personal circumstances.  Yet the asylum statute does not provide 
redress for all misfortune.”288 
                                                          
 282.  See Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971) (rec-
ognizing viability of refugee claim if non-governmental persecutor is able “to carry out its purposes 
without effective hindrance”); Eusaph, 10 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454 (B.I.A. 1964) (indicating that non-
governmental persecution would qualify if “the police powers of the government have degenerated 
to the point where it is unable to take proper measures to control individual cases of violence”).  A 
post-Matter of A-B- decision by the First Circuit confirms the continuing understanding of this 
standard.  See Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 163 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that “an appli-
cant must prove either unwillingness or inability” (emphasis added)).   
 283.  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision).  
 284.  See supra Part III.  
 285.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (persecution must be “on account of” protected 
ground); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (specifying that protected ground must be “one central reason” for 
the harm); see also N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526, 530 (B.I.A. 2011) (explaining that nexus can be 
established “where an [individual] demonstrates more than one plausible motive for the harm im-
posed or the harm feared”). 
 286.  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 338–39 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision). 
 287.  Id. at 317. 
 288.  Id. at 318.  Feminist scholars and theorists, of course, have long rejected the divide between 
“personal” and “public” harm.  Overcoming these distinctions in the law has been a core aim of the 
gender equality movement through the years.  See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O’Byrne, “Can 
You Hear Me Now . . . Good!”® Feminism(s), the Public/Private Divide, and Citizens United v. 
FEC, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 39 (2013) (“An important goal identified by early feminists was 
to challenge and even eliminate the distinction between the public and private spheres.”).  Although 
an in-depth exploration of that literature is outside the scope of this Article, the elimination of the 
public/private divide has been key to the advancement of women’s equality in, for example, the 
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Attorney General Sessions’ decision was a clear attempt to largely shut 
the door on women seeking asylum on the basis of domestic violence.  His 
decision also reflects an explicit desire to impact credible fear screenings at 
the border for these women and many other asylum seekers. 
B.  Immediate Implementation 
Despite having taken a position urging the Attorney General to uphold 
Matter of A-R-C-G- in Ms. A.B.’s case, DHS moved quickly to implement 
his decision in Matter of A-B-, including in credible fear proceedings.  On 
June 13, 2018, John Lafferty, the head of the Asylum Office, issued interim 
guidance instructing officers to apply the decision.289  The brief interim guid-
ance instructed officers in merits adjudications and screening interviews that 
they should no longer cite to or rely on Matter of A-R-C-G-, and instead con-
duct a case-by-case analysis of particular social groups under pre-existing 
BIA caselaw. 
On July 11, 2018, however, far more reaching final guidance replaced 
the interim guidance.290  That guidance, notably, was issued on USCIS let-
terhead with no authorship attribution—diverging from USCIS’s prior prac-
tice of issuing guidance attributed to and signed by the head of the asylum 
office.291  The final guidance instructed (in boldface font) that “[i]n gen-
eral . . . claims based on membership in a putative particular social group de-
fined by the members’ vulnerability to harm of domestic violence or gang 
                                                          
movement for equal pay, the criminalization of domestic violence, the extension of rape laws to 
marital relationships, and the recognition of a Title VII claim against sexual harassment.  See, e.g., 
id.; Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 123 (1993); Vicki Schultz, Recon-
ceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1702 (1998).  Notably, decades of research 
have confirmed the gendered dynamics of domestic violence—research presented to, but never once 
cited by, Attorney General Sessions.  See Brief of Respondent at 39–40, A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 
(A.G. 2018), https://uchas-
tings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291241595459. 
 289.  E-mail from John L. Lafferty to RAIO – Asylum Field Office Managers; RAIO – Asylum 
Field Office Staff; and RAIO – Asylum HQ (June 13, 2018, 5:20 PM) (on file with author) (includ-
ing USCIS Asylum Division Interim Guidance following the Matter of A-B- merits decision). 
 290.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., PM-602-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING 
REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
MATTER OF A-B-, (2018) [hereinafter USCIS GUIDANCE]. 
 291.  See, e.g., JOHN LAFFERTY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HQRAIO 
120/9.15a, GUIDANCE ON IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS IN CREDIBLE FEAR (2014), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2014/MEMO_Guidanc
e_on_Immediate_Family_Members_in_Credible_Fear.pdf; JOHN LAFFERTY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., HQRAIO 120/9.15b, RELEASE OF ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING 
COURSE (ADOTC) LESSON PLAN, CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 
(2014), https://www.fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/dhs_asylum_doc_4212014.pdf.  
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violence committed by non-government actors will not establish the basis 
for . . . a credible or reasonable fear of persecution.”292 
The USCIS Guidance (“Guidance”) also directed officers to apply the 
restrictive analysis of A-B- in several respects—going far beyond simply re-
quiring adherence to A-B-’s central holding in reversing A-R-C-G-.  For ex-
ample, the Guidance stated that “when a private actor inflicts violence based 
on a personal relationship with the victim, the victim’s membership in a 
larger group often will not be ‘one central reason’ for the abuse.”293  It im-
ported A-B-’s conclusory statements regarding social groups to conclude that 
any social group involving inability to leave a relationship is circular.294  The 
Guidance also incorporated A-B-’s language that the government must con-
done or be completely helpless to stop persecution by a private actor.295 
The Guidance additionally sought to maximize the reach of A-B- vis-à-
vis federal circuit court decisions, directing that asylum officers must “apply 
the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that those cases 
are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-.”296  It defined the relevant circuit as 
the one where the applicant is physically present, explaining that circuit law 
elsewhere can simply be ignored—even in the context of screening, and not 
merits adjudications—simply because DHS might relocate individuals else-
where in the country if they establish credible fear.  This attempt to avoid 
consideration of favorable circuit court decisions marked a departure from 
prior agency practice.  Previously, USCIS Guidance directed officers to ap-
ply the circuit interpretations most favorable to the applicant when conduct-
ing border screening interviews.297 
The Guidance instructions were particularly jarring given the asylum 
office’s longstanding recognition of gender-based persecution claims, in-
cluding in the context of domestic violence.298  As described in Part III, 
agency guidance, dating back to the legacy INS era, long recognized the va-
lidity of women’s asylum claims, and more recent asylum office training ma-
terials have confirmed this understanding.299 
                                                          
 292.  USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 6. 
 293.  Id.  
 294.  Id. at 5 (“The applicant must show something more than the danger of harm from an abuser 
if the applicant tried to leave, because that would amount to circularly defining the particular social 
group by the harm on which the asylum claim was based.”).  
 295.  Id. at 6.  
 296.  Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added). 
 297.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV’S, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING 
COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 17, 47 (2017), 
https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/70907; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERV’S, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: REASONABLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION 
AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 11 (2017), https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbed-
dedFile/70908. 
 298.  See supra Section III.B. 
 299.  See Coven, supra note 215; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 216. 
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C.  Grace v. Sessions—Matter of A-B- Enjoined at the Border 
In August 2018, plaintiffs represented by the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies challenged the applica-
tion of Matter of A-B- and the related USCIS Policy Guidance in expedited 
removal.  The twelve plaintiffs—nine adult asylum seekers and three minor 
children—contended that numerous aspects of the decision and guidance vi-
olated the laws governing asylum and expedited removal.  They also alleged 
constitutional due process and separation of powers violations.300  Although 
the lawsuit was not a class action, it sought systemic relief under a provision 
of the immigration laws, Title 8, section 1252(e)(3) of the United States 
Code, which authorizes challenges to expedited removal policies in the 
United States.301 
On December 18, 2019, the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia entered a permanent injunction prohibiting DHS and immigra-
tion judges from applying several aspects of Matter of A-B- and the USCIS 
guidance.302  The district court decision addressed plaintiffs’ statutory claims, 
raised under the Administrative Procedure Act and applied Chevron in re-
viewing Matter of A-B-. 
                                                          
 300.  Complaint, Grace v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-1853, 2018 WL 3812445 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2018).  
The plaintiffs’ statutory claims alleged violations of the Refugee Act, Immigration and Nationality 
Act, and Administrative Procedure Act.  Id.  
 301.  The applicable provision reads:  
(A) In general 
  Judicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its implemen-
tation is available in an action instituted in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of— 
  (i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is con-
stitutional; or 
  (ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy guideline, 
or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney General to imple-
ment such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions of this subchapter or is 
otherwise in violation of law. 
(B) Deadlines for bringing actions 
  Any action instituted under this paragraph must be filed no later than 60 days after the 
date the challenged section, regulation, directive, guideline, or procedure described in 
clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) is first implemented. 
8 U.S.C § 1252(e)(3)(A)–(B) (2012).  The provision guarantees judicial review of expedited re-
moval policies notwithstanding jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the same section, which limit 
review of individual expedited removal decisions and orders.  See id. § 1252(e)(1)–(2).  Of note, 
however, the sixty-day limitation and the requirement that the suit be brought in the D.C. federal 
district court pose large barriers to non-sophisticated litigators.   
 302.  Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 124 (D.D.C. 2018) 
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The court found that Chevron deference does apply to decisions of the 
Attorney General interpreting the “particular social group” ground for asy-
lum.303  Judge Sullivan then analyzed the general rule that domestic violence 
and gang claims will fail under Chevron step two, rejecting it as unreasonable 
for several reasons.  He found “no legal basis” for the rule in the statute and 
deemed it inconsistent with Congress’s intent to comply with its international 
refugee law obligations and to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of 
claims.304  Additionally, he concluded the rule violated the individualized ad-
judication system for asylum, including at the credible fear stage, as well as 
the governing standard for credible fear: 
The Attorney General’s direction to deny most domestic violence 
or gang violence claims at the credible fear determination stage is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the threshold screening standard 
that Congress established: an alien’s removal may not be expedited 
if there is a “significant possibility” that the alien could establish 
eligibility for asylum.305 
The district court also rejected—this time at Chevron step one—the 
heightened state protection standard requiring an applicant to show that her 
government “condoned” or was “completely helpless” to protect her against 
non-State actor persecution.306  The court ruled that the settled meaning of 
“persecution” enacted by Congress in the 1980 Refugee Act required only a 
showing of the government’s inability or unwillingness to provide effective 
protection.307 
Judge Sullivan additionally held that the USCIS Guidance’s prohibition 
of social groups involving an “inability to leave” a relationship was arbitrary 
and capricious.308  According to Judge Sullivan, the Guidance’s conclusion 
on this point both went beyond A-B- itself and misconstrued existing agency 
caselaw on circularity, as prior agency precedent had never required social 
groups to be completely independent from harm.309  Thus, he reaffirmed that 
social group cognizability is a fact-specific analysis.310 
                                                          
 303.  Id.  (“[T]he Court concludes that Congress has not ‘spoken directly’ on the precise question 
of whether victims of domestic or gang-related persecution fall into the particular social group cat-
egory.”).  The court notably rejected the government’s contention that Matter of A-B- and the guid-
ance’s statement that domestic violence and gang claims “will generally fail” did not set forth a 
general rule.  Id. at 125 (“The government’s principal response is straightforward: no such general 
rule against domestic violence or gang-related claims exists.”).  
 304.  Id. at 126. 
 305.  Id. at 126–27. 
 306.  Id. at 128. 
 307.  Id.  
 308.  Id. at 133. 
 309.  See id.; USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 5.  
 310.  Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 133.  
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Finally, Judge Sullivan enjoined the USCIS Guidance’s requirement 
that asylum officers ignore circuit law contrary to Matter of A-B- in adjudi-
cating credible fear cases.311  He observed first, that the wide-ranging anal-
yses in A-B- that stretched beyond the legal effect of overruling Matter of A-
R-C-G- were mere dicta, as conceded by the government—and therefore not 
entitled to deference under Brand X.312  Judge Sullivan continued, “[s]imply 
put, Brand X is not a license for agencies to rely on dicta to ignore otherwise 
binding circuit precedent.”313  He additionally enjoined the instruction to of-
ficers only to apply circuit law in which the applicant was physically present, 
reasoning that this instruction violated the “significant possibility” standard 
for credible fear by forcing adjudicators to ignore favorable circuit law that 
would allow applicants to meet the standard.314 
To remedy these illegalities, Judge Sullivan enjoined the government 
from applying the unlawful aspects of Matter of A-B- and the USCIS Guid-
ance.  He further vacated the expedited removal orders of the twelve individ-
ual plaintiffs and ordered the government to bring back to the United States 
any of the plaintiffs it had removed.315 
*** 
The Grace injunction, which remains in effect pending appeal,316 has 
served as a critical check against executive overreach at the border.  The dis-
trict court rightly concluded that the Matter of A-B- decision conflicted with 
the statutory refugee definition and the laws governing expedited removal, as 
well as unreasonably interpreted ambiguities in the statute.  The relief the 
court ordered, however, was limited in two respects.  First, the injunction 
failed to reach asylum seekers who were previously deported pursuant to the 
unlawful interpretations adopted by USCIS in implementing Matter of A-B-; 
as a result, many individuals who are in fact refugees were likely refouled 
without clear remedy.  Second, the court injunction left in place a structurally 
unsound system of credible fear adjudications, in which future unlawful de-
cisions of the agency may continue to be applied and also result in re-
foulement of refugees.  Below, I consider how different approaches to agency 
                                                          
 311.  The USCIS Guidance instructs that, when conducting credible fear interviews: “The asy-
lum officer should . . . apply the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that those 
cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-.”  See USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 8. 
 312.  Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 138 n.22 (“According to the government, the only legal effect 
of Matter of A-B- is to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G-.  Any other self-described dicta would not be 
entitled to deference under Chevron and therefore Brand X could not apply.”).  
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. at 139–40.  The court also enjoined a portion of the USCIS Policy Guidance that re-
quired applicants to themselves articulate a particular social group at the credible fear stage.  Id. at 
135. 
 315.  Id. at 144–45. 
 316.  Notice of Appeal at 2, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-
01853-EGS). 
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decisionmaking and judicial review at the border can better avoid re-
foulement. 
VI.  REGULATING THE BORDER 
For now, a discussion of permissible agency interpretations of law at the 
border begins with an inquiry under Chevron.  Yet many scholars have care-
fully probed and questioned the applicability and contours of Chevron in im-
migration space.  Professor Kevin Johnson has persuasively argued that the 
political accountability underpinnings of Chevron disfavor its use in this 
space.  He observes that Chevron’s “political process rationale does not apply 
comfortably to the immigration bureaucracy for a simple reason—nonciti-
zens cannot formally participate in the political process.”317  Because immi-
grants lack the power of the vote, they have little ability to hold the executive 
branch officials accountable through the elected office of the Presidency.318  
Moreover, it is precisely the rights of these disenfranchised individuals at 
stake in the decisions of the agency. 
Whereas Professor Johnson has suggested eliminating Chevron defer-
ence to the decisions of the immigration agency entirely,319 others have pro-
posed modifying the framework or discarding Chevron for certain subsets of 
agency decisions.  Professor Bassina Farbenblum, for example, urges 
stronger incorporation of an international law perspective at Chevron step 
one for asylum and withholding decisions.  Because Congress has indicated 
an intent to conform with international law obligations, she argues that courts 
should look to international law consensus and interpretations to construe the 
plain meaning of the statute.320  Or, at a minimum, Professor Farbenblum 
proposes that consistency with international refugee law must robustly in-
form Chevron step two, prompting U.S. federal courts to more closely scru-
tinize decisions out-of-step with comparative and international law.321  Ex-
amining Congressional intent, the structure of the Department of Justice, and 
the evolution of Chevron doctrine—and in particular its step zero—Professor 
Maureen Sweeney concludes that Chevron should not apply to asylum and 
withholding decisions of the Attorney General or BIA.322  She highlights the 
                                                          
 317.  Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants in the Administrative 
State, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 37 (2008). 
 318.  See id. at 39. 
 319.  Id. at 43 (“One incremental solution would be to eliminate Chevron-style deference to the 
decisions of the immigration bureaucracy.  Meaningful judicial review would encourage the immi-
gration agencies to take greater care in immigration matters and to comply with the law.”). 
 320.  Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths 
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1096, 1098 (2011). 
 321.  Id. at 1104. 
 322.  Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases 
71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127 (2019).  Professor Alina Das makes a similar argument with regard to the 
interpretation of federal immigration detention statutes, arguing that Chevron should not apply in 
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dangers of allowing the head or functionaries of the Department of Justice—
which has core prosecutorial functions against immigrants, for example, the 
crimes of illegal entry and re-entry—to also interpret asylum laws designed 
to protect vulnerable populations.323  Professor Mary Holper has scrutinized 
the Attorney General certification process in particular, suggesting that the 
Attorney General’s precedent decisions in the criminal immigration context 
should not survive Chevron step zero.  She contends that they fail to ade-
quately allow public input, ensure transparency, or reflect careful considera-
tion, and as a result, should be analyzed outside Chevron altogether.324 
The invocation of certification authority in Matter of A-B- reflects each 
of the concerns explored by the scholars above.  Asylum seekers, such as Ms. 
A.B. and the thousands of others in removal and credible fear proceedings to 
whom the decision has been applied, lack a voice in the political process.  
The certification of Ms. A.B.’s case also failed to reflect a fair, transparent, 
and accountable process.325  And, the Attorney General’s core prosecutorial 
functions, including those deployed against asylum seekers who enter unlaw-
fully, raise serious doubts about the office’s ability to engage in impartial and 
protection-oriented adjudication of asylum claims.  Indeed, former Attorney 
General Sessions used the power of his office to target asylum-seeker fami-
lies via the criminal process, including by using unlawful entry prosecutions 
to effectuate the Administration’s widely-condemned family separation pol-
icies.326  In prior statements, he also expressed skepticism over the validity 
of the asylum system as a whole as well as subsets of claims within them.327 
Yet, although I agree with the normative non-applicability of Chevron 
deference to Matter of A-B- in merits adjudications for all of these reasons, I 
consider here the special concerns posed by applying this decision—and oth-
ers that adopt restrictive interpretations of asylum law—specifically at the 
border.  Correctly or not, the Supreme Court has applied Chevron to substan-
tive interpretations of the refugee definition arising in merits adjudications of 
asylum claims.  Even so, it does not follow that agency screening interpreta-
tions should proceed in the same way.  Thus, I consider how courts should 
apply Chevron for border screening interviews, and how agencies should 
                                                          
habeas review of detention.  Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Stat-
utory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 189 (2015).   
 323.  See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the 
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 464 (2007) (“An argument can be made, however, 
that deference has less justification in asylum cases than in other areas.”).  Specifically, Professor 
Legomsky observes that ideological biases of immigration judges resulting in huge disparities in 
asylum grant rates diminish rationales for deference.  Id. 
 324.  Mary Holper, Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2011). 
 325.  See supra Section V.A. 
 326.  See supra notes 243–249 and accompanying text. 
 327.  See supra notes 263–265 and accompanying text.  
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structure and apply DOJ precedent decisions.  I also offer thoughts on how 
these recommendations might continue to hold in a post-Chevron world. 
A.  Precedent and Deference Frameworks at the Border 
As discussed, Chevron and its progeny rely on two core justifications 
for the framework.  Deference is due to policy functions of the executive 
branch, ensuring democratic accountability for policy choices.328  Deference 
is also due to agency expertise, including technical know-how arising from 
the qualifications of agency officials and their day-to-day experience of ad-
ministering the statute.329 
In chaotic border interviews, however, an incongruous picture emerges.  
Asylum office adjudicators are indeed specialized in their field, trained not 
only on substantive asylum law, but also on interviewing techniques, the spe-
cial needs of trauma survivors in an adjudicative setting, and the country con-
ditions of sending nations, among other topics.330  Yet their decisions are 
given no real weight under the adjudicative framework.  Rather, the asylum 
officers are bound by the opinions of the BIA—who are immigration gener-
alists, not asylum specialists—and the Attorney General, who is even further 
removed and charged with enforcing all of U.S. law. 
With regard to policy considerations, the office of the Attorney General 
(and to a lesser extent the Board of Immigration Appeals directly under the 
Attorney General) is closer to democratic accountability than the asylum of-
ficer at the border.  Justice Kagan, writing prior to her time on the bench, has 
argued that the accountability principle is so central to Chevron that full def-
erence should extend only to the agency head receiving delegated authority 
from Congress.331  Thus, she urged adoption of what she and Judge David 
Barron termed an “internal-agency nondelegation doctrine.”332  They posit 
that the closer an official sits in the chain of command to the agency head, 
the greater the leeway the courts should provide under Chevron.  Compared 
to a low-level official, the agency head is far more accountable to the will of 
the people due to the nature and visibility of her office.  Justice Scalia reflects 
echoes of this thinking as well.  Although he would not limit broad Chevron 
step two deference to high-ranking officials, he locates justifications of Chev-
ron in the policy functions of the agency.333  However, Justice Gorsuch, in 
                                                          
 328.  See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 329.  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.  
 330.  See Paskey, supra note 159; Boas, supra note 159. 
 331.  David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 242–43 (2001). 
 332.  Id. (“It is only the presence of high-level agency officials that makes plausible Chevron’s 
claimed connection between agencies and the public; and it is only the involvement of these officials 
in decision making that makes possible the kind of political accountability that Chevron viewed as 
compelling deference.”). 
 333.  See Scalia, supra note 25.  
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his views against existing deference frameworks, tacks decidedly away from 
political and policy reasons for deference to agencies and toward their exper-
tise instead.334 
The asylum screening system presents something of a conundrum under 
the differing aims and rationales of Chevron.  Its day-to-day work is carried 
out primarily by specialized asylum officials in one agency (DHS) who sit 
several degrees removed from political accountability.  On the other hand, 
asylum precedents are generated by the agency head or their delegate in an-
other (DOJ), with the Attorney General of course being a cabinet-level offi-
cial confirmed by the Senate.  What role should each of these two disparate 
functionaries play with regard to asylum adjudications in credible fear pro-
ceedings?  What agency law should govern at the border, and when should it 
apply?  And how might deference apply in the absence of Chevron? 
In thinking through these questions, we should also consider that credi-
ble fear interviews are different from merits adjudications.  As explained in 
Part II, credible fear processes are curtailed and rife with documented prob-
lems.  Applicants do not receive full procedural protections of immigration 
removal proceedings; nor do they have the time to secure counsel or prepare 
claims as they would in a merits adjudication.335  In this context, mistakes are 
likely.  Thus, whatever framework applies must give adjudicators leeway for 
error.  But error, of course, can run in both directions.  A screening official 
may err in thinking that an applicant has a viable claim when she does not.  
Or the official may decide the applicant has little chance of prevailing when 
in fact the individual’s claim—fleshed out in better processes and with the 
benefit of counsel and preparation—is strong.  So, for which type of error 
should the applicable framework create room? 
I posit that these sets of questions—on adjudicative roles, governing 
precedent, and allowances for error in credible fear proceedings—can be re-
solved by looking at the overarching statute and its aims.  Although decisions 
of the Attorney General and BIA do bind both immigration judges and asy-
lum officers in adjudicating merits claims under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (“INA”),336 three key aspects of statutory design favor a different 
approach to implementation of DOJ precedent in credible fear screenings. 
First, and most critically, Congress specified a low screening threshold 
for credible fear.  The statute requires an applicant at this stage to show only 
a “significant possibility” that they will prove their asylum claim at a full 
hearing.337  Moreover, as discussed above, Congress was explicit in selecting 
                                                          
 334.  See supra Section I.D. 
 335.  See supra Section II.D. 
 336.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).   
 337.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (“For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘credible fear of per-
secution’ means that there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the state-
ments made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the 
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this standard to prevent the possibility of refoulement of refugees at the bor-
der.338  The point, in short, was to err on the side of screening in, and not out.  
This favors a generous and protective read of substantive asylum law in cred-
ible fear screenings. 
Second, Congress’s 1996 reforms codified into the INA the existence 
and importance of the asylum office.339  Although originally a creature of 
regulation, the asylum office was formalized by Congress specifically in the 
context of credible fear.  As explained above, the laws now mandate that 
credible fear interviews be conducted by asylum officers, overseen by super-
visory officers who have asylum adjudication experience.340  They also re-
quire that both adjudicating officers and their supervisors receive training in 
substantive law, interviewing techniques, and country conditions.341  The 
command here is clear: The credible fear process falls within the jurisdiction 
of a specialized and protection-oriented asylum office—not officials within 
the enforcement arms of the government.  For this reason, CBP-officer 
screening decisions would not only run afoul of the statute,342 but should also 
fail to garner any deference in statutory interpretations. 
Finally, the refugee definition that applies in credible fear derives from 
the Refugee Act of 1980, in which Congress enacted a non-discriminatory 
asylum system to course-correct from a prior politicized era.  As previously 
recounted, the executive branch had once allowed foreign policy interests, 
geography, and political ideology to guide U.S. refugee decisions.343  In en-
acting a universal refugee definition conforming to the international law def-
inition, Congress expressed a clear and unequivocal intent to de-politicize the 
asylum adjudication system.344 
Taken together, these congressional actions favor a modified approach 
to agency adjudications at the border.  In immediately implementing Matter 
of A-B- to such an extreme extent, DHS officials likely refouled refugees in 
violation of both the credible fear standard and U.S. international law obliga-
tions.  If we take seriously Congress’s clearly-stated desire to adhere to those 
                                                          
officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum . . . .”); see also Grace v. Whitaker, 344 
F. Supp. 3d 96, 107 (D.D.C 2018) (characterizing credible fear as a low screening standard). 
 338.  See supra Section II.B. 
 339.  See supra Section II.C. 
 340. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E) (providing the definition of “asylum officer”); see also supra 
Section II.C. 
 341.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E). 
 342.  See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. 
 343.  See supra Section II.A. 
 344.  The Court’s Chevron doctrine also generally favors construing the statute as a cohesive 
whole.  See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) 
(“A court must therefore interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’ 
and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.’” (first quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 
U.S. 561, 569 (1995), then quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959))) (discuss-
ing statutory interpretation at Chevron step one). 
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obligations, we must consider a different approach to the review and imple-
mentation of agency precedent at the border. 
B.  Solutions for a Well-Regulated Border 
To ensure better asylum decisionmaking at the border, I propose several 
changes below for the agency and the courts.  For each, I draw upon my ear-
lier discussions to explore theoretical and practical justifications for these 
shifts.  I also briefly consider how Congress might step in to ensure better 
fidelity to its laws. 
1.  Agency 
Below, I provide three recommendations for the agencies involved in 
credible fear adjudications at the border.  Each is rooted in the statutory de-
sign of our asylum system, as well as in administrative law principles.  First, 
I recommend that DHS delay implementation of protection-restricting DOJ 
precedent decisions in credible fear processes.  Second, I propose that DHS 
simply not apply restrictive DOJ precedent decided under Chevron step two, 
wherein the agency construes statutory ambiguities.  Finally, I suggest eleva-
tion of the role of the asylum office in adjudications leading to precedent DOJ 
decisions. 
a.  A Wait-and-See Approach for Agency Adjudication at the 
Border: Delayed Implementation of Protection-Restricting 
Attorney General and BIA Decisions to Allow for Judicial 
Review 
The “significant possibility” standard is protective and forward-fac-
ing.345  It considers whether a screened-in applicant might, with better prep-
aration in a full removal proceeding, show asylum eligibility down the line.  
The primacy of the judiciary in declaring “what the law is,” considered in 
light of this standard, favors building in time for review of agency decisions 
by the federal courts of appeals.346 
Although agencies can interpret the law, with particular leeway for am-
biguous statutes, they are not its final arbiters.  Rather, the federal courts 
claim that role in our constitutional order.  Thus, irrespective of whether the 
agency reaches an interpretation via Chevron step one or invokes its authority 
under step two, Article III courts have the ultimate say on whether the 
agency’s decision will stand as consistent with plain text, or as a reasonable 
                                                          
 345.  See supra Section II.B; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2019); Inspection and Expedited Removal 
of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Proce-
dures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997). 
 346.  See supra Section I.B; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
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construction of ambiguous text.347  Until they do so, there remains a great 
deal of uncertainty around whether the agency’s interpretation of law will 
survive judicial review. 
I posit that this aspect of constitutional design, combined with the stat-
utory standard for credible fear proceedings, should prompt DHS to wait for 
the federal courts of appeals to review protection-restricting DOJ decisions 
before implementing them at the border.  Although the determinations of law 
of the Attorney General or BIA are immediately controlling upon DHS in the 
merits stages, the “significant possibility” standard for credible fear logically 
contemplates time for the Article III courts to first weigh in.  Because the 
judiciary has final say on what the law is, an agency precedent that rejects or 
casts doubt on an applicant’s claim does not, standing alone, defeat a “sig-
nificant possibility” that the applicant will prevail on the merits.  Accord-
ingly, in credible fear processes, DHS should adopt a wait-and-see approach 
for protection-restricting DOJ precedent. 
Caution and delay are warranted particularly if the restrictive decision 
comprises a change in the agency position as it did in Matter of A-B-, which 
overruled prior precedent accepting domestic violence asylum claims.348  Un-
der step two of the Chevron inquiry, the Court has stated that agency posi-
tions inconsistent with prior views merit less deference,349 or even none at all 
if not adequately explained.350  Shifting agency interpretations are thus espe-
cially suspect, and more susceptible to ultimate rejection by the courts. 
Justice Gorsuch’s decisions while on the Tenth Circuit bench support 
temporal restraint, particularly when agency decisions invoke Brand X to 
reach conclusions contrary to the federal courts.  Per Guitierrez-Brizuela v. 
Lynch, agency pronouncements that “effectively overrule[]” prior judicial 
constructions are “not legally effective” until a reviewing federal court ac-
cepts the agency’s view under Chevron step two.351  Yet, in direct conflict 
with this view, the USCIS Guidance on Matter of A-B- instructed its officers 
to “apply the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that 
                                                          
 347.  It follows that restrictive analyses that are mere dicta and thus do not invoke delegated 
interpretive authority should also not apply in credible fear interviews.  In Grace, Judge Sullivan 
concluded dicta statements are not entitled to Chevron deference.  See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. 
Supp. 3d 96, 138 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 348.  See supra Section V.A. 
 349.  Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) 
(“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier inter-
pretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.” (quoting 
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))).  
 350.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he requirement that 
an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display aware-
ness that it is changing position.  An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub 
silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”). 
 351.  Gutierrez–Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1145 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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those cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-.”352  In Grace v. Whita-
ker, Judge Sullivan correctly enjoined this portion of the USCIS policy mem-
orandum, in addition to substantive illegalities in Matter of A-B-.353  But it 
would have been better, and wiser, for the agency not to have rushed imple-
mentation of a Brand X decision in the first place. 
Finally, individual liberty interests further countenance a wait-and-see 
approach for restrictive agency decisions at the border, particularly in light 
of the substantial risk of rights violations.  The agency’s speedy implemen-
tation of protection-restricting decisions at the border poses precisely the con-
cern highlighted by Justice Gorsuch while on the Tenth Circuit bench in 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, and again in his concurrence in Kisor v. Wilkie: that po-
liticized administrative agents may imperil the legal rights of litigants, par-
ticularly those with minority or disfavored causes.354 
Indeed, should Chevron’s two step framework be overruled, as Justice 
Gorsuch has urged, that would be all the more reason for DHS to delay im-
plementing restrictive agency precedent at the border.  Under Skidmore’s 
more flexible and less deferential standard, an agency interpretation would 
be even less likely to survive judicial scrutiny—and the agency thus even less 
able to declare that administrative decisions defeat an applicant’s “significant 
possibility” of prevailing on the merits. 
But what about decisions that expand refugee protections?  Must the 
agency wait on implementing those in credible fear proceedings, too?  The 
answer, I believe, is no.  Agency precedent recognizing greater protections 
can be implemented immediately without violating the credible fear stand-
ard, precisely because a “significant possibility” is a screen-in standard.  It 
functions not to keep out every ultimately invalid claim, but rather to give 
every potentially viable claim a chance in full proceedings.  Moreover, pro-
tection-expanding decisions, even if later rejected by the courts, do not pose 
the same risk of violating applicants’ rights in the interim.355  Thus, BIA or 
Attorney General decisions that expand the scope of refugee protection may 
be implemented without violating the screening standard, risking re-
foulement, or curtailing applicants’ rights. 
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b.  Nonapplication in Credible Fear of Any Protection-
Restricting Attorney General and BIA Decisions Decided 
Under Chevron Step Two 
A second proposal is for the DHS simply not to implement any protec-
tion-restricting decisions of the Attorney General or BIA construing ambig-
uous statutes in credible fear screenings—irrespective of the outcome of ju-
dicial review.  This approach is supported by the very instability caused by 
the scope of agency options under Chevron step two—even where the agency 
stays within bounds of reasonableness. 
The fact that the agency can later change its mind within a range of per-
missible interpretations means that a Chevron step two agency decision lacks 
permanence.  This, in turn, creates a risk that implementation of the decision 
in border screening interviews will lead to violation of the credible fear 
screening standard: An applicant prevented from establishing a claim under 
today’s narrow agency interpretation may, in theory, still prevail in the future 
under a different agency interpretation.  And indeed, this is what we saw in 
the trajectory of agency precedent decisionmaking on domestic violence asy-
lums claims—and what Ms. Rody Alvarado, the petitioner in Matter of R-A-
, herself experienced—as the prospects of prevailing in her merits case veered 
widely under Attorneys General Reno, Ashcroft, and Mukasey.356 
Notably, although ultimately contrary to Congress’s intent to insulate 
asylum adjudication from political interference (as I argue below and above), 
the policy and political accountability rationales of Chevron357 favor non-
applicability of agency decisions that construe ambiguous statutes to curtail 
applicants’ rights in credible fear.  For, under Chevron step two, agencies 
have significant leeway and may be choosing between multiple reasonable 
interpretations.  If agency decisions on asylum can in fact properly hinge on 
the political aims or foreign policy goals of a given administration, then the 
same agency will likely reach a different conclusion under a future admin-
istration with different political orientations.  Given the current backlog in 
the immigration courts, merits cases can easily span multiple administrations, 
and an applicant who seems to lack a “significant possibility” under today’s 
agency interpretation may well prove their case down the line.  Thus, DHS 
arguably should not apply in credible fear any DOJ decisions that restrict 
asylum protections under Chevron step two—even if those decisions do clear 
the bar for reasonableness. 
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c.  Elevated Agency Consideration of the Protection-Oriented 
Views of the Asylum Office 
DOJ should also more carefully consider the views of DHS, rooted in 
its specialized experience adjudicating asylum claims.  One of the more 
shocking aspects of Matter of A-B- is how little respect Attorney General 
Sessions displayed toward the expertise and interests of a sister agency. 
In the lead-up to his decision, the Attorney General declined DHS’s re-
quest to suspend briefing and to clarify his call of question.358  He even de-
nied in part DHS’s motion for more time to submit briefing, which DHS ex-
plained it needed due to the complexity of the issues and the need for intra-
agency coordination.  In its request, DHS highlighted that it “adjudicates 
thousands of asylum-related matters (including affirmative asylum applica-
tions, credible fear claims, and reasonable fear claims) each year.”359  But 
this fact was not persuasive to Attorney General Sessions on either the motion 
or the merits. 
In his merits ruling, Sessions not only rejected DHS’s view that Matter 
of A-R-C-G- was correctly decided, but also castigated BIA for accepting the 
earlier positions of DHS in issuing its decision.  As explained above, DHS in 
A-R-C-G- agreed with the respondent that a social group based on nationality, 
gender, and inability to leave a relationship could be cognizable, and the BIA, 
in turn, agreed with both parties.360  And because of this, Sessions asserted: 
“A-R-C-G- was wrongly decided and should not have been issued as a prec-
edential decision.  DHS conceded almost all of the legal requirements neces-
sary for a victim of private crime to qualify for asylum based on persecution 
on account of membership in a particular social group.”361  Sessions thus 
drew a negative association between DHS’s agreement with the BIA and the 
respondent, and the validity of the BIA precedent.  He appeared to presume 
that if DHS concedes any issues in cases before the BIA, the BIA should 
decline to generate precedent in those cases. 
I posit that the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G-, and not Attorney General 
Sessions in Matter of A-B-, got it right with respect to inter-agency persua-
siveness and roles.  DHS views, rooted in its experience adjudicating affirm-
ative asylum cases, should not be dismissed out of hand by DOJ.  One im-
portant caveat is necessary: It is the expertise of DHS via its asylum office 
that should be persuasive here, not the prosecutorial interests of ICE.  Unlike 
the asylum office, ICE lacks specialization in humanitarian protection claims, 
instead carrying out broad enforcement of the immigration laws.  Similar lack 
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 359.  Motion on Certification to the Attorney General, supra note 270, at 4.  
 360.  See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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of specialization also merits de-emphasis of the views of CBP on asylum, 
despite the present involvement of border enforcement agents in credible fear 
interviews. 
For its part, if DHS as a whole wishes to better persuade DOJ (and as I 
argue below in Section VI.B.2, eventually the federal courts), it should find 
ways to elevate the voice of its asylum office in official positions before the 
BIA and Attorney General.  This may be accomplished by, for example, en-
suring that DHS counsel appearing before the BIA or Attorney General in 
precedent-generating cases represent the interests and positions of the asylum 
office, and not solely the interests of ICE.  In Matter of A-B-, for example, 
the ICE Office of Principal Legal Advisor alone appeared before the Attorney 
General at the merits posture, whereas in Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-, 
Counsel for USCIS, which houses the asylum office, also appeared.362  The 
appearance of counsel for the asylum office should render DHS’s views more 
persuasive.363 
2.  Courts 
I provide two recommendations for courts reviewing agency interpreta-
tions of asylum law.  First, they must enforce the credible fear standard in a 
way that gives proper credence to their own decisions as Article III courts.  
Second, they should recalibrate Chevron review to favor agency subunits 
with expertise in humanitarian protection.  
a.  Enforce the “Significant Possibility” Screening Standard in a 
Manner That Preserves the Primacy of the Judiciary 
Article III courts play an essential role in protecting asylum claimants 
at the border.  In Grace v. Whitaker, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia properly concluded that Matter of A-B- and the USCIS 
Guidance violated the law in several respects.364  The court’s speedy issuance 
of a permanent injunction undoubtedly prevented DHS from refouling many 
refugees.  As mentioned, however, the injunction did not redress the injuries 
of non-plaintiff asylum seekers removed under unlawful policies.  It also left 
in place a system in which future illegal precedent decisions of DOJ can be 
quickly implemented in screening interviews, before the federal appeals 
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 364.  See supra Section V.C. 
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courts have their say.365  For example, in 2019, DHS promptly implemented 
a restrictive decision of Attorney General William Barr, Matter of L-E-A-,366 
which limited asylum claims based on family persecution.367  DHS applied 
the decision even in credible fear proceedings368 despite L-E-A-’s incon-
sistency with decades of federal circuit court caselaw establishing the viabil-
ity of family-based asylum claims369 and with prior DOJ precedent.370 
The district court’s in-depth decision displayed a sophisticated under-
standing of asylum law on several substantive points.  Yet, federal court re-
view of credible fear policies might also reach a similar end—and an injunc-
tion or temporary restraining order could issue even more quickly—if the 
courts simply ask: Has restrictive agency precedent been implemented in 
credible fear screenings before the federal courts of appeals have weighed in?  
If so, I posit that immediate implementation usurps the proper role of the 
Article III courts, as I explain in greater detail in Section VI.B.1.a.  Although 
I do not repeat that whole discussion here, I underscore that courts should 
recognize that in our constitutional order, their decisions, and not the 
agency’s, ultimately control whether an applicant has a “significant possibil-
ity” of prevailing on the merits in an asylum claim.371  This is currently true 
under Chevron, and would be even more so in Chevron’s absence, which 
would entail lesser deference to agency interpretations. 
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 371.  Or, the courts might ask another, arguably still somewhat simple question: Does the agency 
decision invoke Brand X to restrict refugee protections in a manner that fundamentally reflects a 
policy choice?  This, too, could prompt courts to find a violation of the “significant possibility” 
standard.  See Section VI.B.1.b.   
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b.  Recalibrate Review to Favor Protection-Orientation and 
Agency Expertise over Politically Driven Decisionmaking 
On a more fundamental level, federal courts reviewing agency interpre-
tations of asylum law should re-evaluate their approach to deference to 
agency decisionmaking.  I propose a shift toward protection-oriented agency 
divisions, which would better adhere to congressional intent and design. 
Although strains of Chevron’s democratic accountability rationale have 
featured prominently in the Court’s asylum jurisprudence,372 the laws of Con-
gress in fact demand non-politicized decisionmaking.  As explained above 
and in Section II.A, Congress crafted the refugee definition and asylum sys-
tem as an intentional rejection of politicized refugee decisions.  Moreover, its 
design of expedited removal situates border screenings squarely within the 
protection-oriented and specialized asylum office, not within enforcement-
oriented divisions or even with higher-ranking DHS officials.373 
As mentioned, scholars have persuasively called for non-applicability 
of Chevron to DOJ decisionmaking in asylum law, especially for decisions 
by the Attorney General.374  Even if the Court chooses to generally retain 
Chevron in this space (or at all), however, it should recalibrate its inquiry to 
more easily reject policy-driven decisions.  It can and should do so via a 
modified step two approach, which moves away from viewing asylum law as 
implicating “sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign 
relations,”375 and towards elevating the other core justification of Chevron: 
agency expertise in humanitarian protection.  The Court should review with 
particular scrutiny BIA or Attorney General decisions inconsistent with the 
long-standing practice of the asylum office.  And it should also more readily 
reject as unreasonable DOJ decisions that fail to engage seriously with views 
of the DHS informed by asylum expertise—as occurred in Matter of A-B- 
itself. 
Should the Court wipe Chevron off the books and return to the more 
flexible and less deferential Skidmore inquiry, that would be all the more rea-
son to shift deference toward the specialized experience and humanitarian 
orientation of the asylum office.  For, as Justice Gorsuch observed in Kisor, 
even absent Chevron, agency expertise will undoubtedly continue to serve as 
an important consideration for reviewing courts.376  Politicized asylum deci-
sions of political actors would be far more suspect. 
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3.  Congress 
Although my discussion centers on the proper roles of agencies and the 
courts under immigration laws as written, I would be remiss not to conclude 
with a few thoughts for policymakers beyond the confines of current statutory 
design.  The trajectory of domestic violence asylum law and the debacle of 
Matter of A-B-’s hasty implementation countenance deeper structural 
changes to asylum decisionmaking at the border.  Allowing politicized actors 
to guide protection decisions, especially in an early and procedurally limited 
screening stage, has proven risky and unwise. 
First, and most simply, Congress could end the use of expedited removal 
against asylum seekers.  As the trajectory of Matter of A-B- and the actions 
of the current administration demonstrate, screening procedures at the border 
are too rife with error and too easily manipulated by political actors to ensure 
non-refoulement of refugees.  And, even before A-B- and its faulty imple-
mentation, a growing chorus of experts, including DHS’s own Advisory 
Committee on family detention, advocated for expedited removal’s end or 
significant curtailment.377  The simplest way to prevent refoulement of refu-
gees at the border is to allow asylum seekers to pursue full merits claims 
before the asylum office or immigration courts.  Although Congress might 
retain some basic level of screening to weed out fraudulent claims, prelimi-
nary assessments of the merits of claims, even under a low screening thresh-
old, has proven flawed.378  Eliminating credible fear screenings in favor of a 
default merits adjudication would also bring the work of the asylum office 
back to a sustainable level, thereby reducing the enormous backlog of affirm-
ative asylum claims.379 
Short of elimination, Congress should act to insulate asylum deci-
sionmaking at the border from political pressure.  As an initial matter, it can 
clarify that the favorable decisions of the federal courts, and not the Attorney 
General or BIA, bind asylum adjudicators in border screenings.  Although I 
argue that the screening standard viewed in light of our system of government 
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requires this already, the agencies themselves have disagreed and could use 
explicit constraints. 
Congress should also elevate the role of the asylum office in the adjudi-
cative structure.  Currently, the views of the asylum office are often not ade-
quately reflected in the positions of the DHS before the DOJ adjudicators and 
the federal courts.  Congress could mandate that, when issuing precedent on 
asylum law, the BIA or Attorney General consider the views of the asylum 
office represented separately from ICE’s counsel.  This, in turn, will allow 
reviewing federal courts to glean the extent to which BIA or Attorney Gen-
eral decisions are informed by DHS agency experts on asylum.  Although in 
my view the statute already prohibits officers engaged primarily in enforce-
ment duties from conducting credible fear screenings, Congress could also 
step in with strengthening language to ensure CBP does not encroach upon 
the proper work of the asylum office. 
Additionally, Congress should revisit its jurisdictional bars to federal 
court review of credible fear adjudications, an agency process demonstrably 
rife with error.  Currently, immigration law provides asylum seekers with 
little direct recourse for a negative credible fear finding.380  Although Title 8, 
section 1252(e)(3) of the United States Code allows systemic challenges 
within sixty days of a new expedited removal policy, the time, forum, and 
other limitations of that provision prevent full redress of injuries from unlaw-
ful screening decisions.381 
Lastly, the very delegation of precedent-setting adjudicative authority—
and adjudicative authority at all—to the DOJ in the immigration and asylum 
space bears revisiting.  A growing chorus of scholars, commentators, and ex-
perts have called for an independent Article I immigration court system to 
house both immigration judges and the BIA.382  Their discussions have artic-
ulated compelling consistency, efficiency, due process, and humanitarian 
reasons for such reforms;383 I add only one point here.  Policymakers consid-
ering creation of Article I immigration courts should contemplate how to in-
corporate the specialization and protection-orientation of the asylum office 
into any new system.  Absent careful design, this critical voice may again be 
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diminished or lost.  For example, if the enforcement arm of the DHS (ICE) 
continues to advocate for removal of an individual before an Article I gener-
alist immigration judge, and if an Article I generalist immigration appellate 
board sets applicable precedent, the views of the asylum corps may fail to 
meaningfully inform resulting precedent.  Professor David Koelsch has per-
suasively argued that on this point, we might look to the structure of Canada’s 
Immigration and Refugee Board, wherein Refugee Protection Officers (in 
many ways akin to asylum officers) actively participate in formal hearings 
conducted by the Refugee Board.384  He has suggested that a new Article I 
system of immigration adjudication include strengthened powers of asylum 
officers, including their participation before an Article I immigration court 
and their independence from the DHS.385  In light of the myriad of deficien-
cies we have seen in our current adjudicative structure, we should consider 
other models. 
Finally, it bears mention that even apart from ensuring proper agency 
decisionmaking, Congress should condemn the Trump Administration’s bla-
tant attempts to shut down asylum altogether.  While restrictive agency prec-
edent can be a huge hurdle for applicants, policies such as the “Alternative 
Country Agreements” and “Migration Protection Protocols” issued outside 
of adjudicative processes may pose an even graver threat.386  Both the for-
mer—applied in credible fear through interim regulations—and the latter—
operating outside the credible fear context to force asylum seekers in regular 
proceedings to wait in Mexico—threaten to prevent meaningful access to 
asylum for the vast majority of Central American asylum seekers and others 
at the U.S.-Mexico border.387  These policies violate the laws of Congress 
and run afoul of the design of our system of asylum, intended to ensure com-
pliance with U.S. international law obligations toward refugees. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The politicized treatment of asylum seekers at the border fundamentally 
conflicts with the aims and design of our asylum laws.  To correct against 
discriminatory and ideological treatment of claims, Congress in 1980—in the 
midst of the Cold War—implemented a comprehensive system to shift us 
away from politically-driven refugee adjudications.  In 1996, it built critical 
protections for asylum seekers into expedited removal, which included for-
malizing the existence and expertise of a professionalized asylum office.  Yet 
today, a frenzy of executive policies target asylum seekers at our border in 
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overtly politicized and punitive ways—treatment at least as concerning as the 
refugee decisionmaking of any prior era.388 
Revised agency practices and recalibrated judicial review can help en-
sure fair screenings of asylum claims at the border.  These must account for 
inherent limits of rushed border interviews, the screen-in nature of the credi-
ble fear standard, and the importance of non-discriminatory and humanitarian 
treatment of claims.  In a Chevron world, the impermanence of agency deci-
sions at step two of the inquiry favors delay or caution in applying restrictive 
precedent at the border.  In both a Chevron and possible post-Chevron world, 
elevating the humanitarian orientation and expertise of the asylum office in 
judicial review and agency approaches offers better fidelity to statutory de-
sign.  So too does asserting the primacy of the judiciary in declaring “what 
the law is” when considering whose statutory interpretations control a “sig-
nificant possibility” screening standard.  A combination of these steps will 
better ensure non-refoulement of refugees at the border. 
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